摘要翻译：
最优机构设计有一套完善的理论，也有许多重要的应用。这个领域产生的经验法则影响着方方面面，从政府如何出售无线频谱许可证到主要搜索引擎如何拍卖在线广告。然而，对于一些基本问题，传统的最优机构设计方法是不合适的--要么是因为它提出了过于严格的假设，要么是因为它提倡过于复杂的设计。本调查回顾了优化机制的几个常见问题，包括过高的通信、计算和信息需求；它还举了几个例子来证明，通过一个近似最优机制的放松目标，可以让我们对传统理论似乎无法触及的基本问题进行推理。
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英文标题：
《Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design》
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作者：
Tim Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-Cohen
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Data Structures and Algorithms        数据结构与算法
分类描述：Covers data structures and analysis of algorithms. Roughly includes material in ACM Subject Classes E.1, E.2, F.2.1, and F.2.2.
涵盖数据结构和算法分析。大致包括ACM学科类E.1、E.2、F.2.1和F.2.2中的材料。
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一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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英文摘要：
  Optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, and also a number of killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from how governments sell wireless spectrum licenses to how the major search engines auction off online advertising. There are, however, some basic problems for which the traditional optimal mechanism design approach is ill-suited---either because it makes overly strong assumptions, or because it advocates overly complex designs. This survey reviews several common issues with optimal mechanisms, including exorbitant communication, computation, and informational requirements; and it presents several examples demonstrating that passing to the relaxed goal of an approximately optimal mechanism allows us to reason about fundamental questions that seem out of reach of the traditional theory.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1812.11896