摘要翻译：
拍卖理论被认为为资源的分配提供了更好的出售机会。各组织已采取措施增加参与者对其拍卖系统的信任，但仅靠信任并不能确保高水平的参与。我们提出了一种新的拍卖系统，利用幸运抽奖和赌博成瘾来提高候选人在拍卖中的参与程度。我们的系统利用了现有拍卖系统中的安全特性，以确保公平和维护参与者之间的信任。
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英文标题：
《Addictive Auctions: using lucky-draw and gambling addiction to increase
  participation during auctioning》
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作者：
Ravin Kumar
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  Auction theories are believed to provide a better selling opportunity for the resources to be allocated. Various organizations have taken measures to increase trust among participants towards their auction system, but trust alone cannot ensure a high level of participation. We propose a new type of auction system which takes advantage of lucky draw and gambling addictions to increase the engagement level of candidates in an auction. Our system makes use of security features present in existing auction systems for ensuring fairness and maintaining trust among participants.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.03237