摘要翻译：
我们研究贝叶斯说服博弈，其中沟通是粗糙的。该模型捕捉发送方和接收方之间的交互，其中发送方无法完全描述状态或推荐所有可能的操作。发送者总是从更多的信号中获得微弱的好处，因为这增加了他们说服的能力。然而，更多的信号并不总是导致更多的信息被发送，接收器可能更喜欢粗通信的结果。作为一个激励的例子，我们研究了一个更大的信号空间对应于更好的目标定位能力的广告，并表明客户可能更倾向于更少的目标定位。在一类发送方效用与状态无关的博弈中，我们证明了当接收者更难说服时，附加信号对发送方更有价值。更一般地说，我们刻画了用有限信号发送信息的最优方法，证明了发送者的最优问题可以通过在有限集合内搜索来解决，并证明了信号的边际值的一个上界。最后，我们展示了如何将我们的方法应用于廉价对话和异构先验的设置。
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英文标题：
《Persuasion with Coarse Communication》
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作者：
Yunus C. Aybas and Eray Turkel
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最新提交年份：
2021
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  We study games of Bayesian persuasion where communication is coarse. This model captures interactions between a sender and a receiver, where the sender is unable to fully describe the state or recommend all possible actions. The sender always weakly benefits from more signals, as it increases their ability to persuade. However, more signals do not always lead to more information being sent, and the receiver might prefer outcomes with coarse communication. As a motivating example, we study advertising where a larger signal space corresponds to better targeting ability for the advertiser, and show that customers may prefer less targeting. In a class of games where the sender's utility is independent from the state, we show that an additional signal is more valuable to the sender when the receiver is more difficult to persuade. More generally, we characterize optimal ways to send information using limited signals, show that the sender's optimization problem can be solved by searching within a finite set, and prove an upper bound on the marginal value of a signal. Finally, we show how our approach can be applied to settings with cheap talk and heterogeneous priors.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1910.13547