摘要翻译：
研究了联盟形成博弈的稳定性收敛问题，其中每个agent的策略是可以参与的联盟，结果是联盟结构。在给定自然阻塞动态的情况下，吸收集是联盟结构的最小集合，一旦达到就永远不会被放弃。单吸收集和非单吸收集的共存是导致稳定性收敛性不足的原因。为了刻画两类集合都存在的对策，我们首先将偏好（环）中联盟之间的循环与联盟结构（圈）之间的循环联系起来，证明偏好存在环当且仅当联盟结构存在循环。然后，我们确定了偏好中重叠环的一种特殊构型，刻画了缺乏收敛到稳定的对策。最后，我们将我们的发现应用于共享规则诱导的博弈研究。
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英文标题：
《Non-convergence to stability in coalition formation games》
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作者：
Agust\'in G. Bonifacio, Elena Inarra and Pablo Neme
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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英文摘要：
  We study the problem of convergence to stability in coalition formation games in which the strategies of each agent are coalitions in which she can participate and outcomes are coalition structures. Given a natural blocking dynamic, an absorbing set is a minimum set of coalition structures that once reached is never abandoned. The coexistence of single and non-single absorbing sets is what causes lack of convergence to stability. To characterize games in which both types of set are present, we first relate circularity among coalitions in preferences (rings) with circularity among coalition structures (cycles) and show that there is a ring in preferences if and only if there is a cycle in coalition structures. Then we identify a special configuration of overlapping rings in preferences characterizing games that lack convergence to stability. Finally, we apply our findings to the study of games induced by sharing rules.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2009.11689