英文标题：
《Accountability and Motivation》
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作者：
Liqun Liu
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最新提交年份：
2021
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：General Economics        一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Economics        经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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英文摘要：
  Successful reform policy-making commonly involves correct policy choices followed by quality implementation. When political decision makers carry out these decisions, office-holding motives may prevent them from acting in the most appropriate way. I build a formal model to examine how a decision maker with conflicting policy and office-holding motives makes reform policies across several salient information environments. My model highlights the difficulty of fine-tuning the decision maker\'s motives in a context where pandering is inevitable. I show that backing away from full transparency often helps -- not by eliminating pandering, but by lending credibility to a retention rule that is pivotal on reform outcomes -- to provide a high-powered incentive for implementation. Excessively stringent or lenient transparency requirements direct the decision maker\'s attention to acting congruently without taking the policy consequences seriously.
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