英文标题：
《Liability Design with Information Acquisition》
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作者：
Francisco Poggi and Bruno Strulovici
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最新提交年份：
2020
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英文摘要：
  How to guarantee that firms perform due diligence before launching potentially dangerous products? We study the design of liability rules when (i) limited liability prevents firms from internalizing the full damage they may cause, (ii) penalties are paid only if damage occurs, regardless of the product\'s inherent riskiness, (iii) firms have private information about their products\' riskiness before performing due diligence. We show that (i) any liability mechanism can be implemented by a tariff that depends only on the evidence acquired by the firm if a damage occurs, not on any initial report by the firm about its private information, (ii) firms that assign a higher prior to product riskiness always perform more due diligence but less than is socially optimal, and (iii) under a simple and intuitive condition, any type-specific launch thresholds can be implemented by a monotonic tariff.
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中文摘要：
如何保证公司在推出潜在危险产品之前进行尽职调查？当（i）有限责任阻止公司将其可能造成的全部损害内部化，（ii）仅在损害发生时支付罚款，而不考虑产品的固有风险，（iii）公司在进行尽职调查之前有关于其产品风险的私人信息时，我们研究责任规则的设计。我们证明：（i）任何责任机制都可以通过关税来实施，该关税仅取决于公司在发生损害时获得的证据，而不是公司关于其私人信息的任何初始报告；（ii）在产品风险之前分配更高风险的公司总是进行更多的尽职调查，但低于社会最优水平；（iii）在简单直观的条件下，任何特定类型的发射阈值都可以通过单一费率实现。
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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