英文标题：
《Analysis of Randomized Experiments with Network Interference and
  Noncompliance》
---
作者：
Bora Kim
---
最新提交年份：
2020
---
英文摘要：
  Randomized experiments have become a standard tool in economics. In analyzing randomized experiments, the traditional approach has been based on the Stable Unit Treatment Value (SUTVA: \\cite{rubin}) assumption which dictates that there is no interference between individuals. However, the SUTVA assumption fails to hold in many applications due to social interaction, general equilibrium, and/or externality effects. While much progress has been made in relaxing the SUTVA assumption, most of this literature has only considered a setting with perfect compliance to treatment assignment. In practice, however, noncompliance occurs frequently where the actual treatment receipt is different from the assignment to the treatment. In this paper, we study causal effects in randomized experiments with network interference and noncompliance. Spillovers are allowed to occur at both treatment choice stage and outcome realization stage. In particular, we explicitly model treatment choices of agents as a binary game of incomplete information where resulting equilibrium treatment choice probabilities affect outcomes of interest. Outcomes are further characterized by a random coefficient model to allow for general unobserved heterogeneity in the causal effects. After defining our causal parameters of interest, we propose a simple control function estimator and derive its asymptotic properties under large-network asymptotics. We apply our methods to the randomized subsidy program of \\cite{dupas} where we find evidence of spillover effects on both short-run and long-run adoption of insecticide-treated bed nets. Finally, we illustrate the usefulness of our methods by analyzing the impact of counterfactual subsidy policies.
---
中文摘要：
随机实验已成为经济学的标准工具。在分析随机实验时，传统的方法是基于稳定的单位治疗值（SUTVA:\\cite{rubin}）假设，即个体之间不存在干扰。然而，由于社会互动、一般均衡和/或外部性效应，SUTVA假设在许多应用中无法成立。虽然在放松经文假设方面取得了很大进展，但大多数文献只考虑了完全符合治疗任务的环境。然而，在实践中，如果实际治疗收据与治疗分配不同，则经常会出现不符合情况。在本文中，我们研究了随机实验中网络干扰和不服从的因果效应。溢出效应可以在治疗选择阶段和结果实现阶段发生。特别是，我们明确地将代理人的治疗选择建模为不完全信息的二元博弈，由此产生的均衡治疗选择概率会影响利益结果。结果的进一步特征是随机系数模型，以考虑因果效应中普遍未观察到的异质性。在定义了我们感兴趣的因果参数之后，我们提出了一个简单的控制函数估计，并在大网络渐近下得到了它的渐近性质。我们将我们的方法应用于{dupas}的随机补贴项目，在该项目中，我们发现了对杀虫剂处理过的蚊帐的短期和长期采用产生溢出效应的证据。最后，我们通过分析反事实补贴政策的影响来说明我们方法的有效性。
---
分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Econometrics        计量经济学
分类描述：Econometric Theory, Micro-Econometrics, Macro-Econometrics, Empirical Content of Economic Relations discovered via New Methods, Methodological Aspects of the Application of Statistical Inference to Economic Data.
计量经济学理论，微观计量经济学，宏观计量经济学，通过新方法发现的经济关系的实证内容，统计推论应用于经济数据的方法论方面。
--

---
PDF下载：
-->