the owner is risk neutral while the manager has preferences defined over the mean and variance of his income w and his effort level e as follows: Expected utility=E(w)-φVar(w)-g(e),where g'(0)=0,for e>0,g'(e),g''(e),g'''(e)>0. Possible effort choices are e>0.Conditional on effort level e, the realization of profit is normally distrbuted with mean e and variance σ².

(1)Derive the optimal contract when e is observable

(2)Derive  the optimal linear compensation scheme when e is not observable, What effects do change in φ and σ² have?

以上是题目，我的思路是目标函数是最大化owner的期望利润，当e可见的时候，参与约束是经理的EU>=0.
但是遇到的问题是owner的期望利润怎么表示呢？
e不可见的时候，约束该怎么表示呢？

非常感谢解答！