英文标题：
《Empirical bias and efficiency of alpha-auctions: experimental evidence》
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作者：
Alexander L. Brown and Rodrigo A. Velez
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最新提交年份：
2020
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英文摘要：
  We experimentally evaluate the comparative performance of the winner-bid, average-bid, and loser-bid auctions for the dissolution of a partnership. The analysis of these auctions based on the empirical equilibrium refinement of Velez and Brown (2020) arXiv:1907.12408 reveals that as long as behavior satisfies weak payoff monotonicity, winner-bid and loser-bid auctions necessarily exhibit a form of bias when empirical distributions of play approximate best responses (Velez and Brown, 2020 arXiv:1905.08234). We find support for both weak payoff monotonicity and the form of bias predicted by the theory for these two auctions. Consistently with the theory, the average-bid auction does not exhibit this form of bias. It has lower efficiency that the winner-bid auction, however.
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中文摘要：
我们通过实验评估了在合伙企业解散的情况下，中标人、平均出价和失败者出价拍卖的比较性能。基于Velez和Brown（2020）arXiv:1907.12408的经验均衡精化对这些拍卖进行的分析表明，只要行为满足弱回报单调性，当博弈的经验分布接近最佳响应时，中标和失败者投标拍卖必然表现出某种形式的偏差（Velez和Brown，2020 arXiv:1905.08234）。我们发现，这两次拍卖的弱收益单调性和理论预测的偏差形式都得到了支持。与理论一致，平均竞价拍卖不会表现出这种形式的偏差。然而，与中标拍卖相比，其效率较低。
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：General Economics        一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Economics        经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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