摘要：This paper revisits the old topic of optimal indirect taxation. Consider an economy where all commodities are taxable. Tax revenue is viewed as the “rent” of governmental coercion power, and gross profit as the “rent” of market power. A government maximizes consumer surplus conditional on raising certain tax revenue and gross profit. I first characterize the social optimal resource allocation where a planner makes decisions for the government and consumers. Then I show that the government can realize the social optimal outcome through an indirect tax structure. The optimal tax structure should equalize the after-tax Lerner indexes of all commodities. I also show that the optimal tax structure generally results in welfare gain rather than deadweight loss when labor supply is sufficiently inelastic.

作者简介：汪浩，俄亥俄州立大学经济学博士，北京大学中国经济学研究中心教授。他的研究领域为产业组织理论、企业竞争战略、反垄断与ZF规制，他在International Journal of Industrial Organization、Marketing Science、Management Science等著名学术期刊上发表论文多篇，他还是国内著名期刊《经济学季刊》的副主编。