Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
Volume 1, Pages 1-733 (1992)
Edited by: Robert Aumann and Sergiu Hart
ISBN: 978-0-444-88098-7
40M
Introduction to the series  
Contents of the handbook  
Preface  
Chapter 1 The game of chess  
Chapter 2 Games in extensive and strategic forms  
Chapter 3 Games with perfect information  
Chapter 4 Repeated games with complete information  
Chapter 5 Repeated games of incomplete information: Zero-sum  
Chapter 6 Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero-sum
Chapter 7 Noncooperative models of bargaining  
Chapter 8 Strategic analysis of auctions  
Chapter 9 Location  
Chapter 10 Strategic models of entry deterrence  
Chapter 11 Patent licensing
Chapter 12 The core and balancedness  
Chapter 13 Axiomatizations of the core  
Chapter 14 The core in perfectly competitive economies
Chapter 15 The core in imperfectly competitive economies  
Chapter 16 Two-sided matching  
Chapter 17 Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets  
Chapter 18 The bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus  
Chapter 19 Game and decision theoretic models in ethics
Index



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