America's fear of China
美国对中国的恐惧
May 17th 2007
2007年5月17日


China is a far-from-cuddly beast; but bashing it is a bad idea
中国是决不值得拥抱的野兽；但猛打它却不是好主意



F THE guest list determined a meeting's value, the Strategic Economic Dialogue between China and America on May 22nd would be a roaring success. Almost half the Chinese cabinet is trooping to Washington, DC, for the second of the twice-yearly discussions, conceived by Hank Paulson, America's treasury secretary, between the world's largest economy and its fastest-growing one. The process was designed, in large part, as an antidote to the latest case of Asiaphobia among America's politicians. It is not working.
如果来宾名单决定某次会议的价值，则5月22日举办的美中战略经济对话乃是极大成功。几乎半数的中国内阁阁员列队前往华盛顿特区出席第二次战略经济对话。这种世界上最大的经济体和世界上增长速度最快的经济体之间的战略经济对话由美国财长汉克•保尔森创设，一年两次。在很大程度上，对话的目的在于消解最近在美国政客间蔓延的“恐亚症”。但对话并不奏效。

The itch to get tough with Beijing is urgent in Congress. Brandishing China's growing bilateral trade surplus as proof, congressmen from both parties have denounced the country as a currency manipulator, an illegal export-subsidiser, a violator of rights to intellectual property and all-round trade scoff-law. China-bashers have introduced a dozen bills in the new Congress. Some are bound to languish, but others may be passed—though there would then be further hurdles to jump, not least the president's power of veto (George Bush has other conflicts on his mind). The most threatening include proposals that would declare China's cheap currency an illegal subsidy and allow American firms to seek compensatory tariffs.
国会中，对北京采取强硬态度的强烈愿望已是迫在眉睫。中国在中美双边贸易中的顺差与日俱增，两党议员以此为证据公然抨击中国为操纵货币者、非法的获取出口津贴者、侵犯知识产权者和全面违反贸易法律者。抨击中国的国会议员已在新一届国会中提出一打议案，一些注定要被搁置，而有一些则可能获得通过——虽然需要迈过更多的障碍，特别是总统的否决权这一关（乔治•布什脑子里还有其他斗争）。最具威胁性的提议包括宣布中国的廉价货币乃是非法补贴和允许美国公司寻找补偿性关税。

Politics in Beijing is less open, but the circumstances are similarly unhelpful. Because they have no electoral legitimacy, China's Communist leaders need to deliver the economic goods even more than most congressmen do. Worried about unemployment, the Chinese are loth to let their currency, the yuan, appreciate much faster than at today's snail's pace. And as with all dictatorships, there is the need to seem tough. With the five-yearly Communist Party congress only months away, China's president, Hu Jintao, cannot be seen to be bowing to American pressure on the yuan or anything else.
北京的政治不那么开明，但情势也同样起不了帮助作用。XXXXX领导者不是通过投票使所议问题合法化，所以他们要比美国国会议员输送更多的经济物品。中国人为失业感到忧虑，因此不愿让他们的货币（人民币）元过快升值，只想像如今这样缓慢升值。中国的专政也使得采取强硬措施成为必要。再过几个月，五年一度的中国共产党全国代表大会将召开，看来中国国家主席XXXXX不会屈从于美国人在人民币或其他问题上的压力。

Japanese lessons
日本的教训

Thankfully, an all-out trade war remains unlikely. Congressional leaders seem inclined to act within the rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which limit the scope and scale of any barriers that America can unilaterally impose. And some friction is to be expected in a trading relationship worth well over $300 billion a year. But although today's tensions are not cause for panic, they are a costly and unnecessary distraction—and potentially worse than that.
谢天谢地，尚无展开一场全面贸易战迹象。看来国会领袖们有意在世界贸易组织的规则框架内行事。这些规则限制了美国能够单方面施加的障碍的广度和深度。在这种每年总额超过3000亿美元的贸易关系中，有些摩擦不足为奇。虽然目前的紧张不是恐慌的原因，但却是代价高昂且不必要的混乱——从深层次看比这还要糟糕。

One worrying parallel is the Japanophobia of the 1980s and early 1990s. Back then, Japan's rising bilateral trade surplus and its mounting foreign-exchange reserves were seen as “proof” of its manipulated currency and mercantilist attitude. America's paranoia deepened as its jobless rate climbed—especially when the Japanese started buying landmarks like the Rockefeller Centre. In fact, Japan's bubble economy ended up bursting; but not before an outbreak of foolish protectionism. The economic tension even undermined support in both countries for America's security alliance with Japan.
与此类似的令人忧虑的情形是20世纪80年代和90年代初的“恐日症”。彼时，日本在双边贸易中日益增长的顺差和不断增加的外汇储备被视为日本受到操控的货币和重商主义态度的“证据”。随着失业率攀升，美国的偏执加剧——特别是日本人开始购买诸如洛克菲勒中心这样的地标。事实上，日本的泡沫经济以崩溃告终，但这却发生在愚蠢的保护主义爆发之后。经济关系的紧张甚至损害了两国对美日安全同盟的支持。

The case against China is even weaker than the one against Japan was. Its economy is far more open. Though much poorer than Japan was then, China is already America's fastest-growing export market. And in contrast to the 1980s, the WTO now exists as an umpire for trade disputes. But logic, alas, may count for less than political grievance. America's low unemployment rate looks set to rise in the wake of the housing bust. To American voters, the Chinese are likely to become more prominent rivals, whether it be displacing America at the top of some economic league tables, winning Olympic medals or buying big American firms (the Chinese are rightly keen to diversify from treasury bonds). Most worrying, though, are the strategic risks. Japan was an ally in Asia: China is potentially a military competitor. Trade tensions could make it easier to see China as a rival and harder to enlist it as a partner.
今日对中国的情形比对昔日对日本的情形还要弱一些。中国经济远比日本经济开放。虽然目前的中国比当时的日本穷很多，中国却成了美国的增长速度最快的出口市场。比照20世纪80年代，现有世界贸易组织作为处理贸易纠纷的最高权威机构。唉，可逻辑和政治上的怨愤比起来就算不得什么了。美国的低失业率看来注定要在房地产业不景气后上升。不管中国是将美国排在某些经济排行榜的首位、赢得奥运会奖牌还是收购一些美国大公司（中国人热切期望不仅仅购买美国的长期国库券，这是对的），对美国选民而言，中国人很可能将成为更加突出的敌人。然而最令人忧虑的是战略风险。对美国而言，日本是在亚洲的盟友，中国是潜在的军事竞争者。贸易紧张使美国更容易将中国视为对手，也更难将其列为伙伴。

Running such geopolitical risks would be understandable if China's policies posed a true threat to America's economic health. But they do not. China's intellectual-property violations cost American firms far less than many would have you believe: pirated DVDs may sell for peanuts in the markets of Shanghai, but if Hollywood tried to sell the genuine articles at full price, it would quickly discover that most Chinese could not afford them. Similarly, a stronger yuan would do little to dent America's trade deficit .
如果中国的政策对美国的经济健康构成了实实在在的威胁，出现这样的地缘风险就能让人理解了。但中国的政策并非如此。中国侵犯知识产权使美国公司造成的损失远比许多人让你相信的结果要轻：在上海的市场上，盗版DVD售价低廉，但是如果好莱坞想按全价出售正版碟，它会很快发现绝大多数中国人承受不起。与此相类似的是，更为强劲的（人民币）元对消减美国的贸易赤字不会起什么作用。

So much to lose, so little to gain
所失甚巨，所得无几

The bilateral trade imbalance, the target of so many American politicians' anger, is an economic red herring. Its rise reflects changing supply patterns in Asia: America now imports more stuff that has passed through China—and correspondingly fewer goods from South Korea and Taiwan. China's overall surplus and America's overall deficit have less to do with the value of the yuan than with Chinese saving and American profligacy. True, a stronger, more flexible yuan makes sense for China, because it would help shift spending towards imports and would give Beijing's policymakers greater control over interest rates, making it easier to prevent the economy from overheating. But the effect on America would be small.
众多美国政客指责的目标——双边贸易不平衡，是转移注意力的经济遁词。不平衡加剧反映了亚洲正在变化的供应模式，现在美国从中国进口的商品多于出口到中国的商品——在韩国和台湾也是这种情形，不过数量都相应减少。中国的全部盈余和美国的全部赤字对人民币的价值的影响要小于对中国人储蓄和美国人挥霍的影响。的确，更加强劲和更具灵活性的人民币对中国有意义，因为它将有助于将花销转移到进口，并将给中国的政策制定者对汇率更多的控制，这将更容易防止经济过热。但人民币对美国的影响很小。

Rather than picking fights over the currency, Congress should step back and ask why Americans are so upset with China in the first place. The answer is that China is a scapegoat for broader economic anxieties to do with stagnant wages, rising income-inequality and dwindling health and pension benefits. These insecurities, which also lie behind the bad idea of introducing labour standards in trade agreements, are much better tackled head on—at home.
国会不应就货币问题展开论战，而应退一步首先问一问为什么美国人对中国如此不安。答案是，中国成了与停滞的薪金、扩大的收入不平衡和日益减少的医疗养老金有关的范围更加广泛的经济焦虑的替罪羊。这些不安感也存在于在贸易协定中引进劳动标准这个坏主意之后。最好直接在国内消除这些不安感。

Comprehensive health-care reform to create a system where all Americans have access to portable health insurance would do a lot to reduce workers' anxiety and equip them for an economy that these days demands frequent job shifts. Reform of the payroll tax, a regressive levy that hits the less affluent hardest, would be a good way to shift resources to needier Americans. By contrast, raising barriers to cheap Chinese imports would disproportionately hit the wallets of poor and middle-income American consumers—the very people the Democrats in particular claim to be protecting.
全面的医疗改革，即创设一种使全体美国人都有机会享有可随带的的医疗保险的制度，对纾解工人的焦虑和使他们适应进来需要经常变换工作的经济大有帮助。工资税是递减税，对不太富裕的人打击最大。对该税的改革是将资源转向更有需要的美国人的好办法。与此相对照的是，提升对中国廉价商品进口的门槛将在不同程度上损害美国中低收入消费者的利益——这些人正是民主党人特别声称要保护的。

By scaling back its China-bashing, Congress could avoid such blunders. It would also leave more room to engage Chinese officials on subjects that actually matter. Top of the trade agenda ought to be the successful conclusion of the Doha round of global talks. No country has more at stake in a vibrant WTO than China, yet Beijing has been scandalously unwilling to help push for a Doha deal.
通过逐渐减少对中国的抨击，国会可以避免这些大错。这样也会给同中国官员商谈那些至关紧要的议题留下更大的空间。贸易日程的当务之急是成功结束多哈回合的全球会谈。在摇摆不定的世界贸易组织中，没有哪个国家承担的风险比中国承担的风险多，然而北京一直不愿促成多哈回合达成协议，这令人反感。

But the greatest prizes of Sino-American diplomacy are nothing to do with trade. Avoiding war and conflict, naturally, comes top of the list, whether by co-operation over North Korean and Iranian nukes or by building the trust that minimises the odds of a clash in the Taiwan Strait. Then there is China's expansion into Africa, particularly its cosy relations with genocidal Sudan. Global warming, too, ought to be centre-stage. China is building a new coal-fired power plant every week and is set to surpass America as the biggest source of greenhouse gases within a year. If the world is to contain its carbon emissions, America must not only clean up its own act but also help China to green its economic growth.
然而中美外交的最大收获与贸易无涉。避免战争和冲突自然名列首位，不论是在朝鲜核问题和伊朗核问题上的合作，还是使在台湾海峡发生冲突的几率降至最低的互信建设。随后即是中国向非洲的扩张，特别是中国同曾发生种族灭绝的苏丹的密切关系。全球变暖也应居于显著位置。中国每周都要新修建一个烧煤的发电厂，将在一年内超过美国成为世界上最大的温室气体来源地。如果世界控制炭的排放量，美国一定不能只清扫自家行为，也要帮助中国绿化其经济增长。

Mr Paulson wants the strategic dialogue to address some of these broader issues. Congress should stop distracting him.
保尔森先生想利用战略对话解决这些牵涉面更广的问题中的一些，国会应当停止让他分心的举动

[此贴子已经被作者于2007-5-22 16:39:43编辑过]