一些经济学英文论文下载，大家新年快乐，年后发送30篇免费的

sjfsong

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收藏 2015-01-14

乱七八糟的英文论文一大堆，有空就传点，顺便赚点分，下载，嘿嘿。
另外，有人特别需要哪方面的，可以短消息给我，说不定我有，不过别抱
多大希望，只能瞎猫碰死老鼠了。

一、German labor market and fiscal reforms 1999 to 2008: Can they be blamed for intra-Euro Area imbalances?

In this paper,we assess the impact ofmajor German structural reforms from1999 to 2008 on key macroeconomic variables within a two-country monetary union DSGE model. Bymany, these reforms, especially the Hartz reforms on the labormarket, are considered to be the root of thereafter observed imbalances in the Euro Area. We find that, in terms of German GDP, consumption, investment and (un)employment, the reforms were a clear success albeit the impact on the German trade balance and the current account was onlyminor. Most importantly, the rest of the Euro Area benefited frompositive spillover effects. Hence, our analysis suggests that the reforms cannot be held responsible for the currently observed macroeconomic imbalances within the Euro Area.
Keywords: Fiscal Policy,Labor Market Reforms,DSGE modeling,Macroeconomics

804389837.pdf
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1.1，The Economic Impact of Civil Justice Reforms
Date: 2014-09
By: Dimitri Lorenzani
Federico Lucidi

Quality, independence and efficiency are the key components of effective justice systems, a crucial condition to ensure the proper functioning of important drivers of growth in the EU. This paper focuses on judicial efficiency and investigates the impact of certain structural reforms affecting the civil justice system on selected economic outcomes, such as business dynamics and foreign direct investments (FDI). In doing so, the role of efficiency of justice systems (measured by disposition time and the ratio of pending cases to population, both referred to litigious civil and commercial disputes) is highlighted as a transmission channel linking judicial reforms to economic variables. The work draws upon a dataset based on the reports by the Council of Europe's European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ). The results support the growth potential of judicial reforms rationalising the organisation of courts, fostering investment in in-court ICT and introducing incentives to reduce excessive litigation rates (for instance by enhancing the use of alternative disputes resolution methods), which are all found to positively affect the efficiency of civil justice. By increasing the efficiency of the justice system, these reforms can enhance entrepreneurial activity (as measured by firms' entry rates) and FDI.

ecp530_en.pdf
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1.2 Future Directions for the Irish Economy. Conference Proceedings

Graham Stull

Future Directions for the Irish Economy. Conference Proceedingspdf(2 MB) Choose translations of the previous link

Ireland's successful conclusion of the financial assistance programme provides an important opportunity to assess the prospects of the Irish economy to achieve good growth, to prevent future banking crises and to lock in budgetary and fiscal improvements that were achieved over the course of the Programme. It is also a natural opportunity to assess the adjustment undertaken under the programme, with a view to identifying lessons learned that can contribute to the academic debate, or that can serve as policy guidance for other countries facing similar economic challenges.

ecp524_en.pdf
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Merger Performance and Managerial Incentives
By: Matthias Kräkel and Daniel Müller

We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low synergies—even when targets with high synergies are available—to obtain high-powered incentives and, hence, a high personal income at the merger-management stage.
Keywords: acquisition; merger; moral hazard

bgse02_2014.pdf
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On the Equivalence between Iterated Application of Choice Rules and Common Belief of Applying these Rules
Date: 2014-11-25
By: Michael Trost (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena)

One central issue tackled in epistemic game theory is whether for a general class of strategic games the solution generated by iterated application of a choice rule gives exactly the strategy profiles that might be realized by players who follow this choice rule and commonly believe they follow this rule. For example, Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) and Tan and Werlang (1988) have established that this coincidence holds for the choice rule of strict undominance in mixtures in the class of finite strategic games, and Mariotti (2003) has established that this coincidence holds for Bernheim's (1984) choice rule of point rationality in the class of strategic games in which the strategy sets are compact Hausdorff and the payoff functions are continuous. In this paper, we aim at studying this coincidence in a general way. We seek to figure out general conditions of the choice rules ensuring it for a general class of strategic games. We state four substantial assumptions on choice rules. If the players' choices rules satisfy - besides the technical assumption of regularity - the properties of reflexivity, monotonicity, Aizerman's property, and the independence of payoff equivalent conditions, then this coincidence applies. This result proves to be strict in the following sense. None of the four substantial properties can be omitted without eliminating the coincidence.
Keywords: Iterative deletion procedure, common belief, choice rule, epistemic game theory

On the Equivalence between Iterated Application of Choice Rules and Common Belief of Applying these Rules
Date: 2014-11-25
By: Michael Trost (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena)

One central issue tackled in epistemic game theory is whether for a general class of strategic games the solution generated by iterated application of a choice rule gives exactly the strategy profiles that might be realized by players who follow this choice rule and commonly believe they follow this rule. For example, Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) and Tan and Werlang (1988) have established that this coincidence holds for the choice rule of strict undominance in mixtures in the class of finite strategic games, and Mariotti (2003) has established that this coincidence holds for Bernheim's (1984) choice rule of point rationality in the class of strategic games in which the strategy sets are compact Hausdorff and the payoff functions are continuous. In this paper, we aim at studying this coincidence in a general way. We seek to figure out general conditions of the choice rules ensuring it for a general class of strategic games. We state four substantial assumptions on choice rules. If the players' choices rules satisfy - besides the technical assumption of regularity - the properties of reflexivity, monotonicity, Aizerman's property, and the independence of payoff equivalent conditions, then this coincidence applies. This result proves to be strict in the following sense. None of the four substantial properties can be omitted without eliminating the coincidence.
Keywords: Iterative deletion procedure, common belief, choice rule, epistemic game theory

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sjfsong

2015-1-14 13:03:28

二、Fiscal Consolidation and Sovereign Risk in the Euro-zone Periphery
Date: 2014-11
By: Elton Beqiraj
Massimiliano Tancioni

Sovereign and private sector default probabilities are introduced in a monetary model to evaluate whether the consideration of a sovereign risk channel can affect the size and sign of fiÂ…scal multipliers, an hypothesis recently appeared in the literature. The model is estimated using data of EZ peripheral countries. From posterior estimates and simulations we show that i) the relation between fundamentals, sovereign risk and interest rate spreads is weak; ii) in the short term, the risk channel operates in a pro- cyclical direction, amplifying the effects of Â…fiscal contractions; iii) the consideration of a liquidity trap does not reverse this result.
Keywords: default risk, interest rates, Â…fiscal policy, monetary policy, liquidity trap, Bayesian estimation

wp167.pdf
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Strategic Inaccuracy in Bargaining
Date: 2014-11
By: Hidir, Sinem

This paper studies a buyer-seller game with pre-trade communication of private horizontal taste from the buyer followed by a take it or leave it offer by the seller. The amount of information transmitted improves the gains from trade, but also determines how this surplus will be shared between the two. Lack of commitment to a price creates a hold-up problem and a trade off between efficiency and rent extraction. In this setting, coarse information arises due to the concerns on the terms of the transaction. As the preferences get less important, information transmission becomes less precise. It is shown that in the buyer optimal equilibria of the static and dynamic games, the messages sent are just informative enough to ensure trade. In the dynamic game, the buyer is always better off sending infor- mative messages only at the first period, implying no gains from gradual revelation of information.
Keywords: information; cheap-talk; bargaining; buyer-seller relation

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sjfsong

2015-1-14 13:08:35

三、European Integration and the Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle
Date: 2014-11
By: Margarita Katsimi (Athens University of Economics and Business)
Gylfi Zoega (Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics, Birkbeck)

We estimate the Feldstein-Horioka equation for the period 1960-2012 and find structural breaks that coincide with the introduction of the European single market in 1993, the introduction of the euro in 1999 and the financial crisis in 2008. The results suggest that the correlation between investment and savings depends on institutions, exchange rate risk and credit risk. Furthermore, we find that the pattern of capital flows within the euro zone reflect differences in output per capita, the rate of growth of output per capita and budget balances.
Keywords: Feldstein-Horioka puzzle, European integration.

BWPEF1410.pdf
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3.1 Monetary disunion: The domestic politics of Euroland
Date: 2014
By: Streeck, Wolfgang
Elsässer, Lea

Regional disparities within the European Union have always been perceived as an impediment to monetary integration. This is why discussions on a joint currency, from their very beginning, were linked to compensatory payments in the form of regional policy payments. Structural assistance to poor regions and member states increased sharply at the end of the 1980s. Today, however, fiscal support has to be shared with the new member states in the East. Moreover, due to the financial crisis, the cheap credit that poor EMU member countries enjoyed as a result of interest rate convergence is no longer available. We predict that in the future, some sort of financial aid will have to be provided by rich member countries to poor ones, if only to prevent a further increase in economic disparities and related political instability. We also expect long-lasting distributional conflict between payer and recipient countries far beyond current rescue packages, together with disagreement on the extent of aid required and the political control to be conceded by receiving countries to giving countries. We illustrate the dimension of the distributional conflict by comparing income gaps and relative population size between the center and the periphery of Europe on the one hand and on the other, between rich and poor regions in two European nation-states characterized by large regional disparities, Germany and Italy. While income gaps and population structures are similar in the two countries to those between Northern Europe and the Mediterranean periphery, regional redistribution is much more extensive in the two nation-states. We conclude that this presages a difficult future for the domestic politics of Euroland.Regionale Disparitäten in der Europäischen Union galten immer als Hindernis für den währungspolitischen Integrationsprozess. Aus diesem Grund waren die Verhandlungen über eine zukünftige Währungsunion von Anfang an mit Forderungen nach Ausgleichszahlungen in Form von regionalpolitischen Hilfsprogrammen verknüpft. Strukturhilfen an arme Regionen und Mitgliedsstaaten wurden Ende der 1980er-Jahre erhöht. Heute müssen die entsprechenden Mittel allerdings mit den neuen Mitgliedsstaaten im Osten geteilt werden. Zudem können die ärmeren EWU-Mitglieder seit der Finanzkrise keine günstigen Kredite mehr aufnehmen. Wir gehen davon aus, dass es auch in Zukunft finanzielle Transfers von den reichen zu den armen Mitgliedsstaaten wird geben müssen, selbst wenn sie nur dazu dienen, stärkere wirtschaftliche Disparitäten und damit einhergehende politische Instabilität zu verhindern. Zudem können über die gegenwärtigen Rettungsmaßnahmen hinaus lang anhaltende zwischenstaatliche Verteilungskonflikte zwischen Geber- und Empfängerländern erwartet werden, in welchen es vor allem um den Umfang der Finanzhilfen und die im Gegenzug verlangte Abgabe politischer Kontrolle durch die Empfänger von Transfers gehen wird. Um die Dimension des Verteilungskonflikts zu veranschaulichen, vergleicht der Aufsatz Einkommenslücken und relative Bevölkerungsgrößen zwischen Peripherie und Zentrum der EU mit denen zwischen armen und reichen Regionen zweier Nationalstaaten mit starken regionalen Disparitäten, Italien und Deutschland. Während Einkommenslücken und Bevölkerungsstruktur in den beiden Nationalstaaten denen innerhalb der EWU ähneln, ist die regionale Umverteilung in den Nationalstaaten weitaus höher. Wir schließen daraus, dass die Innenpolitik der Eurozone konfliktreich sein wird.

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sjfsong

2015-1-14 13:17:15

How much of bank credit risk is sovereign risk? Evidence from the eurozone
Date: 2014-10
By: Junye Li (ESSEC Business School)
Gabriele Zinna (Bank of Italy)

We develop a multivariate credit risk model for the term structures of sovereign and bank credit default swaps. First, we separate the probability of joint defaults of large Eurozone sovereigns (systemic risk) from that of sovereign-specific defaults (country risk). Then, we quantify individual banks' exposures to each type of sovereign risk, as well as bank-specific credit risk. Banksï¿½ sovereign risk exposures vary with banksï¿½ size, their holdings of sovereign debt, and expected government support. On average, 45% of French and Spanish banks' credit risk consists in sovereign risk, compared with only 30% for Italian and 23% for German banks. Furthermore, short- to medium-term contracts are particularly informative on sovereign systemic risk.
Keywords: Sovereign and Bank Credit Risk; Credit Default Swaps; Distress Risk Premia; Bayesian Estimation.

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Convergence of European Business Cycles: A Complex Networks Approach
Date: 2014-11
By: Theophilos Papadimitriou (Department of Economics, Democritus University of Thrace, Greece)
Periklis Gogas (Department of Economics, Democritus University of Thrace, Greece; The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, Italy)
Georgios-Antonios Sarantitis (Department of Economics, Democritus University of Thrace, Greece)

We examine the co-movement patterns of European business cycles during the period 1986-2011, with an obvious focal point the year 1999 that marked the introduction of the common currency, the euro. The empirical analysis is performed within the context of Graph Theory where we apply a rolling window approach in order to dynamically analyze the evolution of the network that corresponds to the GDP growth rate cross-correlations of 22 European economies. The main innovation of our study is that the analysis is performed by introducing what we call the Threshold-Minimum Dominating Set (T-MDS). We provide evidence at the network level and analyze its structure and evolution by the metrics of total network edges, network density, isolated nodes and the cardinality of the T-MDS set. Next, focusing on the country level, we analyze each individual country's neighborhood set (economies with similar growth patterns) in the pre- and post-euro era in order to assess the degree of convergence to the rest of the economies in the network. Our empirical results indicate that despite few economies' idiosyncratic behavior, the business cycles of the European countries display an overall increased degree of synchronization and convergence in the single currency era.

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sjfsong

2015-1-14 13:24:55

Economic Impact of Late Payments                               William Connell

Delays in payments in Business to Business (B2B) and Government to Business (G2B) transactions generally have an adverse effect on the cash-flow of firm and can cause firms, particularly small ones, to seek extensions of their overdraft facilities and increase their borrowing. Late payment of commercial debt can play a significant role in the survival of firms as their liquidity can be severely affected, even forcing some firms to exit the market. This has been particularly important during the economic and financial crisis as access to credit has been more restricted.
                                    This note addresses the economic effect of late payments by approximating the possible financial cost for firms and by estimating the empirical link between late payments and the exit rate of firms. Both payment delays in G2B and B2B transactions are considered. The note focuses on four EU countries where late payments are a serious problem (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece), but the econometric analysis linking late payments with exit rates uses a broader set of Member States and thus the results can be easily extended to other countries.
                                    This work was carried out in the context of an ECFIN project which main findings are presented in the report:European Commission (2014) "Market reforms at work in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece", European Economy 5|2014

                              (European Economy. Economic Papers. 531. September 2014.                                                       Brussels. PDF. 28pp. Tab. Graph. Ann. Bibliogr. Free.)

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Auctions vs. Negotiations:The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation
Date: 2014-11-25
By: Herweg, Fabian
Schmidt, Klaus M.

For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information about possible design improvements, if renegotiation is costly, and if the buyer's bargaining position is sufficiently strong. Moreover, we show that negotiations provide stronger incentives for sellers to investigate possible design improvements than auctions. This provides an explanation for the widespread use of negotiations as a procurement mechanism in private industry.
Keywords: Auctions; Negotiations; Procurement; Renegotiation; Adaptation Costs; Loss Aversion; Behavioral Contract Theory.

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sjfsong

2015-1-14 13:46:00

A Competitive Partnership Formation Process
Date: 2013
By: Andersson, T.
Gudmundsson, J.
Talman, A.J.J. (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)
Yang, Z.

A group of heterogenous agents may form partnerships in pairs. All single agents as well as all partnerships generate values. If two agents choose to cooperate, they need to specify how to split their joint value among one another. In equilibrium, which may or may not exist, no agents have incentives to break up or form new partnerships. This paper proposes a dynamic competitive adjustment process that always either finds an equilibrium or exclusively disproves the existence of any equilibrium in finitely many steps. When an equilibrium exists, partnership and revenue distribution will be automatically and endogenously determined by the process. Moreover, several fundamental properties of the equilibrium solution and the model are derived.
Keywords: Partnership formation; adjustment process; equilibrium; assignment market

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sjfsong

2015-1-14 14:14:36

[size=+2]Allocation Games with Caps: From Captain Lotto to All-Pay Auctions
Abstract

A Lotto game is a two-person zero-sum game where each player chooses adistribution on nonnegative real numbers with given expectation, so asto maximize the probability that his realized choice is higher than hisopponent's. These games arise in various competitive allocation setups(e.g., contests, research and development races, political campaigns,Colonel Blotto games). A Captain Lotto game is a Lotto game withcaps,which are upper bounds on the numbers that may be chosen. First, wesolve the Captain Lotto games. Second, we show how to reduce all-payauctions to simpler games—expenditure games—using the solution ofthe corresponding Lotto games. As a particular application we solveall-pay auctions with unequal caps, which yield a significant increasein the seller's revenue (or, the players' efforts).

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Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation
Date: 2014
By: Bester, Helmut
Dahm, Matthias

We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low–cost service is sufficient or whether a high–cost treatment is required to solve the consumer’s problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and signals are not observable. Treatments are contractible, but success or failure of the low–cost treatment is observed only by the consumer. Payments can therefore not depend on the objective outcome but only the consumer’s report, or subjective evaluation. A failure of the low–cost treatment delays the solution of the consumer’s problem by the high–cost treatment to a second period. We show that the first–best solution can always be implemented if the parties’ discount rate is zero; an increase in the discount rate reduces the range of parameter combinations for which the first–best can be obtained. In an extension we show that the first–best is also always implementable if diagnosis and treatment can be separated by contracting with two different agents.
Keywords: credence goods; information acquisition; moral hazard; subjective evaluation

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sjfsong

2015-1-14 14:18:42

Inefficient equilibria and lockouts in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time.
Date: 2014-09
By: Ahmet Ozkardas (Turgut Özal Üniversitesi et Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne)
Agnieszka Rusinowska (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics)

We consider a union-firm wage bargaining in which the preferences of the union and the firm are expressed by sequences of discount rates varying in time. The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, we consider a model in which the union must choose between strike and holdout in case of disagreement. We show that there exist inefficient subgame perfect equilibria in the model where the union engages in several periods of strikes prior to reaching a final agreement. Furthermore, we analyze a wage bargaining in which the firm is allowed to engage in lockouts. We consider a game in which only lockouts are feasible, i.e., strikes are not allowed. We prove that under certain assumptions there is a subgame perfect equilibrium for this game and it leads to an immediate agreement which yields the union a wage contract smaller that the statuts quo contract. Under this equilibrium the firm always locks out the union after its own offer is rejected and holds out after rejecting an offer of the union.
Keywords: Union, firm bargaining, varying discount rates, subgame perfect equilibrium, inefficient equilibria, strike, lockouts.

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2015-1-14 14:19:33

Equilibrium Paths in Discounted Supergames
Date: 2014-12
By: Kimmo Berg (Systems Analysis Laboratory, Aalto University School of Science)
Mitri Kitti (Department of Economics, University of Turku)

This paper characterizes the subgame-perfect pure-strategy equilibrium paths in discounted supergames with perfect monitoring. It is shown that all the equilibrium paths are composed of fragments called elementary subpaths. This characterization result is complemented with an algorithm for finding the elementary subpaths. By using these subpaths it is possible to generate equilibrium paths and payoffs. When there are finitely many elementary subpaths, all the equilibrium paths can be represented by a directed graph. These graphs can be used in analyzing the complexity of equilibrium outcomes. In particular, it is shown that the size and the density of the equilibrium set can be measured by the asymptotic growth rate of equilibrium paths and the Hausdorff dimension of the payoff set.
Keywords: repeated game, subgame-perfect equilibrium, equilibrium path, graph presentation of paths, complexity

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2015-1-14 14:23:24

Precision of Market-Generated Information in Economies with Coordination Motives
Date: 2014
By: Myungkyu Shim (University of California, San Diego)
Giacomo Rondina (University of California, San Diego)

a class of economies where firms display coordination motives in presence of dispersed information and where the outcome of the coordination is traded in a competitive asset market Â´a-la Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). We show that when more private information is injected in the coordination economy the equilibrium asset price becomes less informative. To showcase the relevance of our result we present an application to a problem of endogenous information choice where the "Knowing What Others Know" property of information acquisition derived by Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) breaks down in presence of market-generated information.

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2015-1-14 14:24:42

Product Customization in the Spokes Model
Date: 2014-11
By: Aoki, Reiko
Hillas, John
Kao, Tina

We use a spokes model to analyze ?ms?customization incentives when facing the choices of standard and niche products. Products at or near the end of the spokes are customized products, while products near the origin are more standardized products that cater to the taste of many consumers. Our results indicate that although monopolist always offers the standard product, if a ?m anticipates entry, it may choose to stake claim to a customized product. For low transportation costs, the early entrant chooses the standard product. But this equilibrium is characterized by aggressive pricing behavior.
Keywords: product differentiation, product customization, entry, spatial oligopoly

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2015-1-14 14:35:02

Optimal Joint Liability Lending and with Costly Peer Monitoring
Date: 2014
By: Carli, Francesco
Uras, R.B. (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

This paper characterizes an optimal group loan contract with costly peer monitoring. Using a fairly standard moral hazard framework, we show that the optimal group lending contract could exhibit a joint-liability scheme. However, optimality of joint-liability requires the involvement of a group leader, who heavily takes care of the partner's repayment share in bad states and gets compensated in expected terms. This key result holds even for a group of borrowers, which exhibits homogeneous characteristics in productivity, risk aversion and monitoring costs. Our work rationalizes the widely-applied group-leadership concept of microfinance programmes as an outcome of an optimal contract.
Keywords: Micro finance; Joint-liability; Group leader.

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2015-1-14 14:38:31

Subsistence induced and complementarity induced irrelevance in preferences

Abstract

In a two-good setting we axiomatize (a) preferences with subsistence consumption and (b) a generalized version of Leontief preferences. Our axiomatization allows for different levels of subsistence and captures the presence of poverty and prosperity. Our axioms are based on the irrelevance of one of the goods at certain consumption bundles. For subsistence, the irrelevance is induced by the subsistence requirement and for generalized Leontief, it is induced by complementarity. We capture this difference using the notion of unhappy sets.

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2015-1-14 14:50:33

Dynamic monopoly with demand delay
Date: 2014-11
By: Akio Matsumoto
Keiko Nakayama

Implicit in the text-book monopoly is an assumption of complete and instantaneous information or knowledge available to economic agents at free of charge. Under such circumstances, knowing the certain price and cost functions, the monopolist can make an optimal decision of price and output to maximize its profit and realize it. As a result, the text-book monopoly model becomes static in nature. There are, however, many empirical works to indicate that such an assumption of rational economic agents goes too far. In reality the monopolist is boundedly rational and adjusts its price and output as a function of its limited knowledge and past experiences. To fill this gap, we propose, in this study, to relax this assumption and develop a dynamic monopoly model. In particular, we assume first that the monopolist has only partial information about the market condition and second that the monopolist obtains it with time delay. In natural consequence of these alternations, the monopolist cannot jump to the optimal point but searches for it with using the actual data obtained through the market. The modified model becomes dynamic in nature. This is the issue far outside the scope of the text book monopoly and it is what we will consider in this study. In the recent literature, various learning processes of the boundedly rational monopolist have been extensively studied. Puu [1995, CSF] constructs a discrete-time monopoly model in which price function is cubic and cost function is linear. It is shown that the gradient learning or search process based on locally obtained information might behave in an erratic way under the condition that the price function has an inflection point. Assuming that the monopolist uses a rule of thumb to determine quantity to produce, Naimzada and Ricchiute [2008, AMC] reconsider Puu's model with a linear cost function and a cubic price function without the inflection point. Their model is then generalized by Askar [2013, EM] who replaces the cubic function with higher-order polynomials. Matsumoto and Szidarovszky [2013] further generalize Asker's model by introducing the more general type of the cost function. Since those models are described by one dimensional difference equation, chaotic dynamics can arise via period-doubling bifurcation. In this study we reconsider a dynamic monopoly model from two different points of view. First, to detect the effect caused by non-instantaneous information, the dynamic process is constructed in continuous-time scales and a fixed time delay is introduced. Second, we discretize the continuous process to obtain a 'delay' discrete process and analyse the delay effect on discrete dynamics. In both models, local stability of a stationary state is analytically considered and global dynamics is numerically examined.
Keywords: Dynamic monopoly; bounded rational; time delay; nonlinea dnamics

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sjfsong

2015-1-14 15:04:41

Price Discrimination in Asymmetric Industries: Implications for Competition and Welfare
Date: 2014-11
By: Hinnerk Gnutzmann (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore)

Price discrimination by consumer's purchase history is widely used in regulated industries, such as communication or utilities, both by incumbents and entrants. I show that such discrimination can have surprisingly negative welfare eects { even though prices and industry prots fall, so does consumer surplus. Earlier studies that did not allow entrants to discriminate or assumed symmetric rms yielded sharply dierent results, the pro{competitive eect of price discrimination are stronger in these settings. Imposing a pricing constraint on incumbent's discrimination leads the entrant to discriminate more heavily, but still improves both consumer and producer welfare.
Keywords: History{based price discrimination, asymmetric price discrimination, switching cost

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2015-1-14 15:05:49

The Beauty Contest and Short-Term Trading
Date: 2014-11-26
By: Giovanni Cespa (Cass Business School, CEPR, and CSEF)
Xavier Vives (IESE Business School)

Short-termism need not breed informational price inefficiency even when generating Beauty Contests. We demonstrate this claim in a two-period market with persistent liquidity trading and risk-averse, privately informed, short-term investors and find that prices reect average expectations about fundamentals and liquidity trading. Informed investors engage in "retrospective" learning to reassess inferences (about fundamentals) made during the trading game's early stages. This behavior introduces strategic complementarities in the use of information and can yield two stable equilibria that can be ranked in terms of liquidity, volatility, and informational efficiency. We derive implications that explain market anomalies as well as empirical regularities.
Keywords: price speculation, multiple equilibria, average expectations, public information, momentum and reversal

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2015-1-14 15:09:58

Contributing to Public Goods as Individuals versus Group Representatives: Evidence of Gender Differences
Date: 2014-07-30
By: Hauge, Karen Evelyn (Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research,)
Røgeberg, Ole (Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research,)

We report evidence from a laboratory experiment comparing contributions in public good games played as individuals to contributions made as group representatives. We find that women alter their behaviour more than men. The change is in an out-group friendly direction: while men’s contributions are largely similar across the two treatments, women increase their contributions by 40% on average as group representatives. The results are consistent with empirical research from labour markets suggesting that female corporate leaders emphasize stakeholders beyond the shareholders to a larger extent than men, and they are in line with stereotypes commonly held regarding male and female leaders.
Keywords: responsibility; group representative; gender; public good game; laboratory experiment

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2015-1-14 15:29:45

The Shaping Power of Market Prices and Individual Choices on Preferences. An Experimental Investigation
Date: 2014-12-01
By: Sergio Beraldo
Valerio Filoso
Marco Stimolo

We repeatedly elicited individuals' Willingness to Accept (WTA) evaluations for an auctioned bad in an experimental setting in which truthful revelation is the (weakly) dominant strategy. We investigate whether the observation of supposedly irrelevant signals (the market price, the asks at either the bottom or the top of the distribution of asks) affect the elicited values. Our experimental sample was made up of 162 subjects partitioned in 18 independent markets characterized by different informational conditions. Our analysis provide two main findings. First, individuals’ WTA evaluations are remarkably driven by a strong although unexpected tendency to conform to the asks either at the bottom or the top of the distribution by a factor of 44-66\%. Second, although a clear tendency to adapt one's own ask to the market price (Shaping effect) emerges when no other information is being provided, the provision of information about the actual behavior of well identified (groups of) individuals more than halves its magnitude, suggesting that this effect may also qualify as a peculiar case of conformity. We conjecture that in the context at hand conformity emerges as an adaptive response to a problem of preferences imprecision. Our results are identified by means of a methodology not yet employed in the field, which helps in distinguishing between the dynamic and the asymptotic features of preference formation in the presence of either adaptive or rational expectations. The overall evidence suggests a decisive role for market interactions in the definition of preferences.
Keywords: Endogenous preferences, Shaping effect, Conformity, Experimental Vickrey auction.

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2015-1-14 15:38:25

Uncertain Penalties and Compliance
By: Carol Luengo
Marcelo Caffera
Carlos Chávez

Using a series of laboratory economic experiments, we study the effect of information regarding the amount of the fine on the individual decision to violate an emission standard. Specifically, the analysis considers variations in the information available for the regulated subjects regarding the amount of the monetary sanction, as well as variations in the stringency in the inspection effort by the regulator. Our results suggest that in the case of a regulation design that induces compliance, the presence of uncertainty regarding the amount of the fine may increase violations in certain cases. When enforcement is not sufficient to induce compliance, the uncertainty regarding the amount of the fine does not have any effect on the level of transgression. Overall, the results suggest that a cost-effective regulation design should consider including public information on the consequences of an offense.
Keywords: s Uncertainty; Risk; Compound risk; Fine; Emission standard; Economic experiment

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2015-1-14 15:48:45

Date: 2013-03
By: Erlend Berg
Maitreesh Ghatak
R Manjula
D Rajasekhar
Sanchari Roy

This paper studies the interaction of incentive pay and social distance in the dissemination of information. We analyse theoretically as well as empirically the effect of incentive pay when agents have pro-social objectives, but also preferences over dealing with one social group relative to another. In a randomised field experiment undertaken across 151 villages in South India, local agents were hired to spread information about a public health insurance programme. Relative to at pay, incentive pay improves knowledge transmission to households that are socially distant from the agent, but not to households similar to the agent.
Keywords: public services, information constraints, incentive pay, social proximity, knowledge transmission

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2015-1-14 15:54:11

Risky Choices of Poor People: Comparing Risk Preference Elicitation Approaches in Field Experiments
Date: 2014-11-18
By: Holden , Stein (Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences)

This paper studies the risk preferences of poor rural households in Malawi and compares the Holt and Laury (2002) (HL) multiple price list approach with hypothetical real-world framing and monetary incentive-compatible framing with the Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010) (TCN) monetary framing approach to elicit prospect theory parameters. The consistency of the results, the role of and potential bias attributable to measurement error, and correlations with socioeconomic characteristics are assessed. The study shows that measurement error can lead to upward bias in risk aversion estimates and over-weighting of low probabilities. The hypothetical real–world HL framing experiments are associated with higher sensitivity to background variation such as exposure to a recent drought shock and distance to markets/poor market access.
Keywords: expected utility theory; prospect theory; risk preferences; loss aversion; probability weighting; field experiment; multiple price lists; measurement error; Malawi
JEL: C93 D03 O12

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2015-1-14 16:04:41

Self-Confidence, Overconfidence and Prenatal Testorone Exposure : Evidence from the Lab
Date: 2014
By: Dalton, P.S. (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)
Ghosal, S.

Abstract: This paper examines whether the degree of confi dence and overconfi dence in one's ability is determined biologically. In particular, we study whether foetal testosterone exposure correlates with an incentive-compatible measure of con fidence within an experimental setting. We fi nd that men (rather than women) who were exposed to high testosterone levels in their mother's womb are less likely to overestimate their actual performance, which in turn helps them to gain higher monetary rewards. Men exposed to low prenatal testosterone levels, instead, set unrealistically high expectations which results in self-defeating behavior. These results from the lab are able to recon- cile hitherto disconnected evidence from the fi eld, by providing a link between traders' overcon fidence bias, long-term financial returns and prenatal testosterone exposure.

2014-014.pdf
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日新少年

2015-1-14 21:38:58

楼主上传吧这些论文质量还都不错，就按照现在的格式上传吧我绝对大把大把地给论坛币，大把大把地给分，谢谢您对论坛的贡献

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2015-1-15 09:18:24

Tradeoffs between Self-interest and Other-Regarding Preferences Cause Willpower Depletion
By: Hanna Fromell (University of Nottingham, School of Economics)
Daniele Nosenzo (University of Nottingham, School of Economics)
Trudy Owens (University of Nottingham, School of Economics)

In this paper we show that making choices that involve conflicts between self-interest and otherregarding concerns may deplete cognitive resources and willpower and thus reduce individuals' ability to exert self-control. In a lab experiment we use a series of modified dictator games to manipulate whether subjects are exposed to tradeoffs between their self-interest and the interest of others: in a Conflict treatment the option that maximizes the dictator's payoff always minimizes the recipient's payoff, whereas in the NoConflict treatment dictator’s and recipient’s payoffs are aligned. We then measure how decision-making in the dictator games affects subjects’ performance in a subsequent and unrelated task that requires exertion of willpower. We find that subjects in the Conflict treatment perform significantly worse than those in NoConflict. This effect is particularly marked for dictators who experienced a stronger conflict during the dictator games.
Keywords: other-regarding preferences; willpower; self-control; depletion; dictator game; Stroop task.

cedex-discussion-paper-2014-14.pdf
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2015-1-15 09:19:42

The long-term impact of matching and rebate subsidies when public goods are impure: Field experimental evidence from the carbon offsetting market
Date: 2014
By: Kesternich, Martin
Löschel, Andreas
Römer, Daniel

In this paper, we investigate both short- and long-term impacts of financial stimuli on public goods provision when contributions are tied to individual harm-related behavior. We conduct a large-scaled field experiment to examine voluntary contributions to a carbon offsetting program during the online purchase of a bus ticket. We systematically vary the individual payoff structure by introducing different matching grants (1/3:1, 1:1, 3:1) and price rebates (r-25%, r-50%, r-75%). Our results show that price rebates are more effective than matching schemes in raising participation rates while matching grants induce higher contributions to the offsetting program. We suspect differences in the personal responsibility for the compensated emissions to drive this result. Analyzing repeated bookings, we find decreasing treatment effects for returning customers except for the case of 1:1 matching grants. The equal matching scheme is also the only intervention that increases net contributions of customers compared to the control group.

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2015-1-15 09:20:54

Using artefactual field and lab experiments to investigate how fee-for-service and capitation affect medical service provision
Date: 2014-11-26
By: Brosig-Koch , Jeannette (Faculty of Economics and Business Administration)
Hennig-Schmidt , Heike (Department of Health Management and Health Economics)
Kairies-Schwarz, Nadja (Faculty of Economics and Business Administration)
Wiesen, Daniel (Department of Health Management and Health Economics)

We analyze how physicians, medical students, and non-medical students respond to nancial incentives from fee-for-service and capitation. We employ a series of artefactual eld and conventional lab experiments framed in a physician decision-making context. Physicians, participating in the eld, and medical and non-medical students, participating in lab experiments, respond to the incentives in a consistent way: Signi - cantly more medical services are provided under fee-for-service compared to capitation. Our ndings are robust regarding subjects' gender, age, and personality traits.
Keywords: artefactual field Experiment; laboratory experiment; fee-for-service; capitation; physician behavior

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2015-1-15 09:23:53

The Effect of Perceived Regional Accents on Individual Economic Behavior: A Lab Experiment on Linguistic Performance, Cognitive Ratings and Economic Decisions
Date: 2014-11
By: Heblich, Stephan (University of Bristol)
Lameli, Alfred (University of Marburg)
Riener, Gerhard (Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE))
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8640&r=exp
Does it matter if you speak with a regional accent? Speaking immediately reveals something of one's own social and cultural identity, be it consciously or unconsciously. Perceiving accents involves not only reconstructing such imprints but also augmenting them with particular attitudes and stereotypes. Even though we know much about attitudes and stereotypes that are transmitted by, e.g. skin color, names or physical attractiveness, we do not yet have satisfactory answers how accent perception affects human behavior. How do people act in economically relevant contexts when they are confronted with regional accents? This paper reports a laboratory experiment where we address this question. Participants in our experiment conduct cognitive tests where they can choose to either cooperate or compete with a randomly matched male opponent identified only via his rendering of a standardized text in either a regional accent or standard accent. We find a strong connection between the linguistic performance and the cognitive rating of the opponent. When matched with an opponent who speaks the accent of the participant's home region – the in-group opponent –, individuals tend to cooperate significantly more often. By contrast, they are more likely to compete when matched with an accent speaker from outside their home region, the out-group opponent. Our findings demonstrate, firstly, that the perception of an out-group accent leads not only to social discrimination but also influences economic decisions. Secondly, they suggest that this economic behavior is not necessarily attributable to the perception of a regional accent per se, but rather to the social rating of linguistic distance and the in-group/out-group perception it evokes.

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2015-1-15 09:25:05

Endogenous Preferences and Conformity: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment
Date: 2014-12-01
By: Sergio Beraldo (Università di Napoli Federico II and CSEF)
Valerio Filoso (Università di Napoli Federico II)
Marco Stimolo (Università di Napoli Federico II and Università di Salerno)

We repeatedly elicited individuals? Willingness to Accept (WTA) evaluations for an auctioned bad in an experimental setting in which truthful revelation is the (weakly) dominant strategy. We investigate whether the observation of supposedly irrelevant signals (the market price, the asks at either the bottom or the top of the distribution of asks) affect the elicited values. Our experimental sample was made up of 162 subjects partitioned in 18 independent markets characterized by different informational conditions. Our analysis provide two main findings. First, individuals? WTA evaluations are remarkably driven by a strong although unexpected tendency to conform to the asks either at the bottom or the top of the distribution by a factor of 44-66%. Second, although a clear tendency to adapt one?s own ask to the market price (Shaping effect) emerges when no other information is being provided, the provision of information about the actual behavior of well identified (groups of) individuals more than halves its magnitude, suggesting that this effect may also qualify as a peculiar case of conformity. We conjecture that in the context at hand conformity emerges as an adaptive response to a problem of preferences imprecision. Our results are identified by means of a methodology not yet employed in the field, which helps in distinguishing between the dynamic and the asymptotic features of preference formation in the presence of either adaptive or rational expectations. The overall evidence suggests a decisive role for market interactions in the definition of preferences.

wp384.pdf
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2015-1-15 09:26:17

Effects of Retirement and Lifetime Earnings Profile on Health Investment
Date: 2014
By: Hernán Bejarano (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, Orange, CA)
Hillard Kaplan (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, Orange, CA and University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM)
Stephen Rassenti (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, Orange, CA)

We report the results of experiments where in each period of her lifetime the subject must choose how to allocate real earned income between health investment and life enjoyment in each period of a nine-period life in order to maximize aggregate life enjoyment. The key dynamic optimization challenge of the experiment to subjects derives from the fact that investments in health affect future income, but detract from current consumption. Our experimental results show that subjects were successful at reproducing the qualitative predictions of the theoretical model, investing more in health in the absence of retirement and with increasing income profiles. However, we did observe a systematic bias in health investments, being less than optimal in early periods and greater than optimal in late periods of life. We also found a significant effect due to social groupings. These results highlight the potential of lab experiments as a method to study health decisions and understand their determinants.
Keywords: experimental economics, behavioral economics, health economics, dynamic programming

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2015-1-15 09:47:10

Auction Mechanisms and Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals and Selection
Date: 2014-12
By: Aniol Llorente-Saguer (Queen Mary University of London)
Ro’i Zultan (Ben-Gurion University)

The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of bidding rings. In equilibrium, collusive negotiations are either successful or are avoided altogether, hence such analysis neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In such contingencies, information revealed in the negotiation process is likely to affect the bidding behavior in first-price (but not second-price) auctions. We test experimentally a setup in which collusion is possible, but negotiations often break down and information is revealed in an asymmetric way. The existing theoretical analysis of our setup predicts that the first-price mechanism deters collusion. In contrast, we find the same level of collusion in first-price and second-price auctions. Furthermore, failed collusion attempts distort the bidding behavior in the ensuing auction, leading to loss of efficiency and eliminating the revenue dominance typically observed in firstprice auctions.
Keywords: Auctions, Collusion, Bribes, Experiment

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