Network Monitoring and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Date:    2014-12
By:    Luke Boosey (Department of Economics, Florida State University)
R. Mark Isaac (Department of Economics, Florida State University)

We report experimental findings on the impact of network structure on decentralized monitoring and punishment in public goods games. In the environment we study, individuals can only directly monitor and punish their immediate neighbors in an exogenously determined network. We examine contributions and punishment decisions in a Complete network, a Circle network, and an Asymmetric network. Average contributions are lower in the Asymmetric network, although this result is driven entirely by the player who faces only one potential punisher. We also examine whether asymmetry in the network leads some punishers to discriminate between their potential targets. After controlling for targets' contribution decisions, we find limited support for this hypothesis. However, the data indicate that some punishers may be deterred from issuing discriminatory punishment by undermonitored targets who retaliate against previous punishment more often than others. Thus, we identify an additional complication of asymmetry in the network - that it may facilitate more targeted revenge by under-monitored players.
Keywords:    networks, public goods, punishment, revenge

Privacy concerns, voluntary disclosure of information, and unraveling: An experiment
Date:    2014
By:    Benndorf, Volker
Kübler, Dorothea
Normann, Hans-Theo

We study the voluntary revelation of private information in a labor-market experiment where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payoff, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further revelation. Such unraveling can be observed frequently in our data although less often than predicted. Equilibrium play is more likely when subjects are predicted to conceal their productivity than when they should reveal. This tendency of under-revelation, especially of low-productivity workers, is consistent with the level-k model. A loaded frame where the private information concerns the workers' health status leads to less revelation than a neutral frame.

Tools, Fertilizer or Cash? Exchange Asymmetries in Productive Assets
Date:    2014-12-03
By:    Holden, Stein (Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences)
Bezu, Sosina (Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences)

We used a field experiment to investigate exchange asymmetries in productive assets among poor rural respondents in Ethiopia. Farmers were randomly allocated two types of productive assets or cash, with a choice to keep the productive asset (cash) or exchange it for cash (productive asset). To introduce productive asset variation, a durable asset (farm tool) and a short-term input (fertilizer) were randomly allocated and combined with a random amount of cash. Loss aversion was proxied with a separate experiment and was used to assess the importance of endowment effect theory to explain exchange asymmetries. A greater exchange asymmetry was found for the more popular tool than for fertilizer. Loss aversion could explain a small but significant part of the exchange asymmetry in tools, but experience did not reduce the exchange asymmetry. Compared to the female respondents, the male respondents exhibited greater exchange asymmetries and more non-linear price responses with declining elasticities as prices increased. Key words: exchange asymmetry, endowment effect, loss aversion, factor markets, productive assets, input demand elasticities, field experiment. JEL codes:

Fundamental Value Trajectories and Trader Characteristics in an Asset Market Experiment
Date:    2014
By:    Breaban, A.
Noussair, C.N. (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract: We report results from an asset market experiment, in which we investigate how the time path of the fundamental value trajectory affects the level of adherence to fundamentals. In contrast to previous experiments with long-lived assets, there is a phase in which fundamental values are constant before the onset of a trend. The trend is either increasing or decreasing, depending on the treatment. We compare the level of mispricing between the decreasing and increasing fundamental value trajectories. Before the market begins, risk aversion, loss aversion, and cognitive reflection protocols are administered to traders. We find evidence for closer adherence to fundamental values when the trajectory follows a decreasing, than when it has an increasing, trend. Greater average risk aversion on the part of traders in the market predicts lower market prices. The greater the level of loss aversion of the trader cohort, the lower the quantity traded. The greater the average cognitive reflection test score, the smaller the differences between market prices and fundamental values. The variation between groups in risk aversion, loss aversion, and CRT score, explains an additional 44% and 18% of the cohort-level variation in price level and mispricing, respectively, compared to a model including only treatment, experience level, and subject pool.
Keywords:    Bubble; Experiment; Risk Aversion; Loss Aversion; Cognitive Reflection

Cooperation among Strangers in the Presence of Defectors: An Experimental Study
Date:    2013-11
By:    Luciana Cecilia Moscoso Boedo (Division of Economics, CIDE)
Lucia Quesada
Marcela Tarazona

Does the rotten apple spoils his companions? This is the question we analyze in the context of a repeated population game with behavioral types. Our experimental results show that the inclusion of a non-cooperative player in an anonymous community makes cooperation much more difficult to sustain but that individuals still manage to trust some of the permanent players of society. The rotten apple lowers the quality of the companions, but is not able to completely spoil them.
Keywords:    Population games, anonymous random matching, social norms.

Vitamin A Deficiency and Training to Farmers: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Mozambique
Date:    2013
By:    Rute Caeiro
Pedro C. Vicente

Vitamin A deficiency is a widespread public health problem in Sub-Saharan Africa. This paper analyzes the impact of a food-based intervention to fight vitamin A deficiency using orange-fleshed sweet potato (OFSP). We conducted a randomized evaluation of OFSP-related training to female farmers in Mozambique, in which the treatment group was taught basic concepts of nutrition, and OFSP-planting and cooking skills. We found encouraging evidence of changes in behavior and attitudes towards OFSP consumption and planting, and considerable increases in nutrition-related knowledge, as well as knowledge on cooking and planting OFSP. JEL codes: O12, O13, O33, I15
Keywords:    Vitamin A, Orange-fleshed Sweet Potato, Mozambique, Randomized Evaluation

ABSTRACT
Seasonal Credit Constraints and Agricultural Labor Supply:
Evidence from Zambia*
Small-scale farming remains the primary source of income for a majority of the population in
developing countries. While most farmers primarily work on their own fields, off-farm labor is
common among small-scale farmers. A growing literature suggests that off-farm labor is not
the result of optimal labor allocation, but is instead driven by households’ inability to cover
short-term consumption needs with savings or credit. We conduct a field experiment in rural
Zambia to investigate the relationship between credit availability and rural labor supply. We
find that providing households with access to credit during the growing season substantially
alters the allocation of household labor, with households in villages randomly selected for a
loan program selling on average 25 percent less off-farm labor. We also find that increased
credit availability is associated with higher consumption and increases in local farming
wages. Our results suggest that a substantial fraction of rural labor supply is driven by short
term constraints, and that access to credit markets may improve the efficiency of labor
allocation overall.

Unintended Effects of Anonymous Resumes
Date:    2014-10
By:    Behaghel, Luc
Crépon, Bruno
Le Barbanchon, Thomas

We evaluate an experimental program in which the French public employment service anonymized resumes for firms that were hiring. Firms were free to participate or not; participating firms were then randomly assigned to receive either anonymous resumes or name-bearing ones. We find that participating firms become less likely to interview and hire minority candidates when receiving anonymous resumes. We show how these unexpected results can be explained by the self-selection of firms into the program and by the fact that anonymization prevents the attenuation of negative signals when the candidate belongs to a minority.
Keywords:    anonymous applications; discrimination; randomized experiments

Self-Regulatory Organizations Under the Shadow Of Governmental Oversight: An Experimental Investigation
Date:    2014-11
By:    Silvester Van Koten
Andreas Ortmann

Self-regulatory organizations (SROs) can be found in education, healthcare, and other not-for-profit sectors as well as in the accounting, financial, and legal professions. DeMarzo et al. (2005) show theoretically that SROs can create monopoly market power for their affiliated agents, but that governmental oversight, even if less efficient than oversight by the SRO, can largely offset the market power. We provide an experimental test of this conjecture. For carefully rationalized parameterizations and implementation details, we find that the predictions of DeMarzo et al. (2005) are borne out.
Keywords:    experimental economics; self-regulatory organizations, governmental oversight;

赞~\(≧▽≦)/~

还真不少啊。。。。

thanks a lot

THANKS A  LOT

mark~~~留着以后慢慢看

楼主加油

这还算多,20分之一都不到

这就叫多啦,20分之一都不到

好家伙~~~先收藏着吧~~~

你在哪下的？

朋友email转给我的

楼主收藏了好多东西啊

船都漂走了，还捞根门栓干嘛？为人民服务，免费可好/

非常好，感谢分享。

学习，学习

工作太忙了，没有时间

Essays in behavioral economics : Applied game theory and experiments
Date:    2014
By:    Mermer, A.G. (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

Behavioral Economics aims at understanding the decision of economic agents who are not necessarily monetary utility maximizers and accounts for the fact that agents may have other concerns next to economic gain. This thesis contributes to the literature by studying the behavior of economic agents who are not necessarily monetary utility maximizers in situations with strategic interaction. The second chapter solves a game-theoretic model of contests assuming that agents have reference-dependent preferences. The results help to explain behavior observed in recent experiments that is hard to reconcile with the assumption of standard preferences. The optimal price mechanism is derived which differs markedly from the one derived under the assumption of standard preferences. The third and fourth chapters use laboratory experimentation which allows for careful scrutinizing of behavioral assumptions made in economic models. The third chapter experimentally investigates agents’ cooperative behavior in indefinitely-repeated dilemma games with different strategic environments. It is reported that subjects play collusive choices significantly more often when actions exhibit strategic substitutability than when actions exhibit strategic complementarity. In Chapter 4 we experimentally study information acquisition in a social dilemma game. It is reported that in a twice-repeated trust game trustors choose to be informed about the type of the trustee in a setting where, theoretically, having such information is detrimental for cooperation and material payoffs.

Soft Paternalism and Nudging - Critique of the Behavioral Foundations
Date:        2014-12-20
By:        Pasche, Markus

This brief note rises doubts on the argument that nudging will help people to behave more rational in terms of their own preferences. This justification of soft paternalism overlooks some methodological problems of expected utility theory which are one of the roots of behavioral economics.
Keywords:        soft paternalism; nudging; behavioral economics, utility theory, rationality

谢谢楼主，楼主可不可以做个目录啊