在老师让翻译的农经方面关于存储的文章中遇到的,上下文如下:
The lack of a capacity to store can be advantageous as a source of commitment in a two-period game between an oil importer and an oil exporter. Another context in which storage capacity may be disadvantageous is in a context of self-motivated, stabilizing risk-sharing such as the "sovereign borrowing" studied by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)and, in a renegotiation-proof context, by Kletzer and Wright (2000), and the related literature on risk-sharing in village economics [Ligon (1998)]. In these models, storage can increase the value of autarchy, weaking the force of punishments that reduce a defector's utility to the autarchy level, thus diminishing the potential for consumption-smoothing achieved by a sequence of unilateral equilibrium transfers[Ligon et al.2000]
谢谢!