麻烦楼主能不能给出具体的文章题目/作者/摘要？这样也便于大家查阅。

顺便补充一下：文章的题目与作者和摘要

1.Bounded rationality, institutions and uncertainty

David Dequech Jun 2001

Journal of Economics Issues

This paper assesses the usefulness and limitations of the notion of bounded rationality for a theory of economic behavior and institutions under uncertainty, in particular if this theory emphasizes institutions. The paper distinguishes the lack of knowledge caused by complexity from fundamental uncertainty, as well as from less strong notions of uncertainty. Next, the relation between bounded rationality and institutions is discussed. With qualifications, the paper criticizes Simon’s theory for focusing on rules of thumb that may be strictly individual and for not paying enough attention to the social context, to habits and to the tacit aspects of institutions. A theory of bounded rationality revised in the light of these criticisms would still be inadequate to study behavior under fundamental uncertainty. The paper then incorporates this type of uncertainty into a discussion of rationality and institutions. It argues against neglecting the connection between innovation and rationality or implying that innovation is not rational. People may use their knowledge to be partly unconventional. Animal spirits and creativity determine whether behavior breaks with the usual way of doing things or not.

2. Bounded Rationality: Static versus Dynamic Approach

Suren Basov December,2002

Two kinds of theories of the boundedly rational behavior are possible. Static theories focus on stationary behavior and do not include any explicit mech- anism for temporal change. Dynamic theories, on the other hand, explicitly model the fine-grain adjustments made by the subjects in response to their recent experiences. The main contribution of this paper is to argue that the restrictions usually imposed on the distribution of choices in the static approacharegenericallynotsupportedbyanexplicitadjustmentmechanism.

3. Perfect or Bounded Rationality? Some Facts, Speculations and Proposals

Werner Guth and Hartmut Kliemt

The paper focues on empirical studies of a class of very simple games of the reward allocation, ditator and ultimatum type. It is demonstrated that true explanations of social phenomena cannot conceivably be derived in terms of the perfect rationality concept underlying neo-classical economics. Analyzing the simple simple paradigm games it is explored in some depth, if speculatively, how experimental game theory might bring us closer to a new synthesis or the nucleus of a general theory of "games and boundedly rational economics behavior" with more explanatory power.

4.Structural stability implies Robustness to Bounded Rationality

Luca Anderlini David Canning

The introduction of a small amount of bounded rationality into a model sometimes has little e?ect, and sometimes has a dramatic impact on predicted behavior. We call a model robust to bounded rationality if small deviations from rationality result only in small changes in the equilibrium set. We also say that a model is structurally stable if the equilibrium set (given fully rational agents) varies continuously with the parameter values of the model. It is easy to see that when the equilibrium set is discontinuous, bounded rationality can have a very large impact on behavior in the neighborhood of the discontinuity. We go further and show that it is only at such discontinuities that bounded rationality can have large e?ects. It follows that a model is robust to bounded rationality if and only if it is structurally stable. Thus, we can characterize which models will be robust to bounded rationality and which will not, independently of the exact form that the bounded rationality takes

谢了先，看看摘要，然后在下了

谢谢，之前只是笼统的学习，这次可以系统了解了！