摘要翻译：
研究了在战略代理存在的情况下，异构资源的公平分割问题，即通常所说的蛋糕分割和杂务分割。虽然在以前的工作中已经确定了这种情况下的一些结果，但它们主要依赖于自由处置假设，即允许该机制不计成本地扔掉部分资源。在目前的工作中，我们消除了这一假设，并将重点放在总是分配整个资源的机制上。对于具有分段一致估值的两个代理，我们给出了一个真实的、无嫉妒的切蛋糕和分担家务的机制，并通过对该机制施加某些附加约束来补充我们的结果，证明了这种机制不存在。此外，我们给出了满足各种性质的机制的效率上界，并给出了具有限制类的多Agent的真实机制。
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英文标题：
《Truthful Fair Division without Free Disposal》
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作者：
Xiaohui Bei, Guangda Huzhang, Warut Suksompong
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  We study the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous resource, commonly known as cake cutting and chore division, in the presence of strategic agents. While a number of results in this setting have been established in previous works, they rely crucially on the free disposal assumption, meaning that the mechanism is allowed to throw away part of the resource at no cost. In the present work, we remove this assumption and focus on mechanisms that always allocate the entire resource. We exhibit a truthful and envy-free mechanism for cake cutting and chore division for two agents with piecewise uniform valuations, and we complement our result by showing that such a mechanism does not exist when certain additional constraints are imposed on the mechanisms. Moreover, we provide bounds on the efficiency of mechanisms satisfying various properties, and give truthful mechanisms for multiple agents with restricted classes of valuations.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1804.06923