摘要翻译：
我们考虑了一个对共同利益的贡献的随机博弈，其中参与者对贡献的程度有连续的控制，并且我们检验了由搭便车效应引起的渐进性。这个博弈属于可变让步博弈的范畴，它将消耗战推广开来。文献中已知的可变让步博弈的例子，以奇异控制策略为特征的没有任何让步延迟的产量均衡。然而，这些无延迟均衡与典型消耗战的混合策略均衡形成鲜明对比，在典型消耗战中，每个参与者延迟让步一个随机的时间。通过对Nerlove-Arrow模型的推广，我们发现具有单个状态变量的变量贡献博弈具有一个均衡，该均衡的特征是规则控制策略导致逐步让步。这种均衡自然地概括了典型消耗战中的混合战略均衡。问题的随机性突出了奇异控制解与正则控制平衡解之间的定性差异。我们还发现，参与者之间的非对称性可以缓解渐进性导致的低效率。
---
英文标题：
《Game of Variable Contributions to the Common Good under Uncertainty》
---
作者：
H. Dharma Kwon
---
最新提交年份：
2019
---
分类信息：

一级分类：Mathematics        数学
二级分类：Optimization and Control        优化与控制
分类描述：Operations research, linear programming, control theory, systems theory, optimal control, game theory
运筹学，线性规划，控制论，系统论，最优控制，博弈论
--
一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
--
一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Mathematical Finance        数学金融学
分类描述：Mathematical and analytical methods of finance, including stochastic, probabilistic and functional analysis, algebraic, geometric and other methods
金融的数学和分析方法，包括随机、概率和泛函分析、代数、几何和其他方法
--

---
英文摘要：
  We consider a stochastic game of contribution to the common good in which the players have continuous control over the degree of contribution, and we examine the gradualism arising from the free rider effect. This game belongs to the class of variable concession games which generalize wars of attrition. Previously known examples of variable concession games in the literature yield equilibria characterized by singular control strategies without any delay of concession. However, these no-delay equilibria are in contrast to mixed strategy equilibria of canonical wars of attrition in which each player delays concession by a randomized time. We find that a variable contribution game with a single state variable, which extends the Nerlove-Arrow model, possesses an equilibrium characterized by regular control strategies that result in a gradual concession. This equilibrium naturally generalizes the mixed strategy equilibria from the canonical wars of attrition. Stochasticity of the problem accentuates the qualitative difference between a singular control solution and a regular control equilibrium solution. We also find that asymmetry between the players can mitigate the inefficiency caused by the gradualism.
---
PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1904.00500