摘要翻译：
出价泄露是第一价格密封投标拍卖中的一种腐败方案，即采购人将对手的出价泄露给受青睐的参与者。这类参与者的理性行为是在接近截止日期时出价，以便收到所有出价，这使他能够确保以尽可能好的价格获胜。虽然这种行为确实在数据中留下了可检测的痕迹，但由于投标泄漏标签的缺乏，监督分类是不可能的。相反，我们将投标泄漏检测问题简化为一个正-未标记分类问题。关键的想法是将失败的参与者视为公平，而将获胜者视为可能腐败。这使得我们可以估计样本中出价泄漏的先验概率，以及每个特定拍卖的出价泄漏的后验概率。我们提取并分析了2014年至2018年间60万次俄罗斯采购拍卖的数据。我们发现，大约9%的拍卖暴露于出价泄露，这导致了1.5%的价格上涨。对于底价较高、参与人数过低或过高、以及获胜者在较早的拍卖中遇到过拍卖人的拍卖，出价泄漏的预测概率较高。
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英文标题：
《Stealed-bid Auctions: Detecting Bid Leakage via Semi-Supervised Learning》
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作者：
Dmitry I. Ivanov and Alexander S. Nesterov
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：General Economics        一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Economics        经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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英文摘要：
  Bid leakage is a corrupt scheme in a first-price sealed-bid auction in which the procurer leaks the opponents' bids to a favoured participant. The rational behaviour of such participant is to bid close to the deadline in order to receive all bids, which allows him to ensure his win at the best price possible. While such behaviour does leave detectable traces in the data, the absence of bid leakage labels makes supervised classification impossible. Instead, we reduce the problem of the bid leakage detection to a positive-unlabeled classification. The key idea is to regard the losing participants as fair and the winners as possibly corrupted. This allows us to estimate the prior probability of bid leakage in the sample, as well as the posterior probability of bid leakage for each specific auction.   We extract and analyze the data on 600,000 Russian procurement auctions between 2014 and 2018. We find that around 9% of the auctions are exposed to bid leakage, which results in an overall 1.5% price increase. The predicted probability of bid leakage is higher for auctions with a higher reserve price, with too low or too high number of participants, and if the winner has met the auctioneer in earlier auctions.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1903.00261