摘要翻译：
我们探索一个人从观察社会中得出的结论，当他考虑到个人的结果可能受到群体层面歧视的影响时。注入一个单一的非经典假设，即代理人对自己过于自信，我们解释了社会信念中观察到的关键模式，并做出了许多额外的预测。首先，代理人比外人更相信对他所在的任何群体的歧视，捕捉到广泛观察到的以自我为中心的歧视观点。第二，代理人与个人分享的团体成员越多，他对个人的评价就越积极。这解释了关于社会判断的一个最基本的事实，群体内的偏见，以及通过特权群体的优越感来为任意的社会等级制度辩护的“合法化神话”。第三，偏见对代理人在评估结果时如何将社会划分为群体很敏感。这提供了一个理由，说明为什么不应提出一些带有种族色彩的问题，也提供了一个潜在的渠道，说明为什么建国政策可能是有效的。第四，给代理人更多关于自己的准确信息增加了他的所有偏见。第五，代理人倾向于替代偏见，这意味着引入一个新的局外人群体来关注会产生对新群体的偏见，但会降低对其他群体的偏见。第六，代理人倾向于更多地同意同组的人。作为我们模型的微观基础，我们解释了为什么过度自信的代理人可能会在评估结果时允许潜在的歧视，即使他最初没有想到这种可能性。
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英文标题：
《Overconfidence and Prejudice》
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作者：
Paul Heidhues, Botond K\H{o}szegi, Philipp Strack
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  We explore conclusions a person draws from observing society when he allows for the possibility that individuals' outcomes are affected by group-level discrimination. Injecting a single non-classical assumption, that the agent is overconfident about himself, we explain key observed patterns in social beliefs, and make a number of additional predictions. First, the agent believes in discrimination against any group he is in more than an outsider does, capturing widely observed self-centered views of discrimination. Second, the more group memberships the agent shares with an individual, the more positively he evaluates the individual. This explains one of the most basic facts about social judgments, in-group bias, as well as "legitimizing myths" that justify an arbitrary social hierarchy through the perceived superiority of the privileged group. Third, biases are sensitive to how the agent divides society into groups when evaluating outcomes. This provides a reason why some ethnically charged questions should not be asked, as well as a potential channel for why nation-building policies might be effective. Fourth, giving the agent more accurate information about himself increases all his biases. Fifth, the agent is prone to substitute biases, implying that the introduction of a new outsider group to focus on creates biases against the new group but lowers biases vis a vis other groups. Sixth, there is a tendency for the agent to agree more with those in the same groups. As a microfoundation for our model, we provide an explanation for why an overconfident agent might allow for potential discrimination in evaluating outcomes, even when he initially did not conceive of this possibility.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1909.08497