摘要翻译：
我们研究平权行动政策下的学校选择问题，在这种情况下，当局在每所学校为特定的学生群体保留一定比例的名额，学生不仅对他们匹配的学校有偏好，而且对他们获得的名额类型也有偏好。在一些学生群体需求较低的情况下，这种保留政策可能会造成浪费。为了解决这一问题，我们构造了一个选择函数族，即动态保留选择函数，该函数适用于尊重组内公平并允许从低需求组向高需求组转移的学校。我们提出了累积提供机制(COM)作为一种分配规则，每个学校都使用一个动态的储备选择函数，并证明了它对学校选择函数是稳定的，是策略证明的，并且尊重改进。此外，我们还证明了在COM下，转移更多的空时隙会导致策略证明的帕累托改进。
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英文标题：
《Dynamic Reserves in Matching Markets》
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作者：
Orhan Ayg\"un and Bertan Turhan
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  We study a school choice problem under affirmative action policies where authorities reserve a certain fraction of the slots at each school for specific student groups, and where students have preferences not only over the schools they are matched to but also the type of slots they receive. Such reservation policies might cause waste in instances of low demand from some student groups. To propose a solution to this issue, we construct a family of choice functions, dynamic reserves choice functions, for schools that respect within-group fairness and allow the transfer of otherwise vacant slots from low-demand groups to high-demand groups. We propose the cumulative offer mechanism (COM) as an allocation rule where each school uses a dynamic reserves choice function and show that it is stable with respect to schools' choice functions, is strategy-proof, and respects improvements. Furthermore, we show that transferring more of the otherwise vacant slots leads to strategy-proof Pareto improvement under the COM.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2005.01103