英文标题：
《Hiring from a pool of workers》
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作者：
Azar Abizada and In\\\'acio B\\\'o
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最新提交年份：
2020
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英文摘要：
  In many countries and institutions around the world, the hiring of workers is made through open competitions. In them, candidates take tests and are ranked based on scores in exams and other predetermined criteria. Those who satisfy some eligibility criteria are made available for hiring from a \"pool of workers.\" In each of an ex-ante unknown number of rounds, vacancies are announced, and workers are then hired from that pool. When the scores are the only criterion for selection, the procedure satisfies desired fairness and independence properties. We show that when affirmative action policies are introduced, the established methods of reserves and procedures used in Brazil, France, and Australia, fail to satisfy those properties. We then present a new rule, which we show to be the unique rule that extends static notions of fairness to problems with multiple rounds while satisfying aggregation independence, a consistency requirement. Finally, we show that if multiple institutions hire workers from a single pool, even minor consistency requirements are incompatible with variations in the institutions\' rules.
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中文摘要：
在世界各地的许多国家和机构，通过公开竞争雇佣工人。在这些考试中，考生参加考试，并根据考试成绩和其他预定标准进行排名。那些符合某些资格标准的人可以从“员工库”中招聘在每个事先未知数量的轮次中，都会宣布空缺，然后从该人才库中雇佣员工。当分数是选择的唯一标准时，程序满足期望的公平性和独立性。我们表明，当采取平权行动政策时，巴西、法国和澳大利亚使用的既定储备方法和程序无法满足这些要求。然后，我们提出了一个新的规则，我们证明这是唯一的规则，它将静态公平概念扩展到多轮问题，同时满足聚合独立性这一一致性要求。最后，我们表明，如果多个机构从一个人才库雇佣员工，即使是较小的一致性要求也与机构规则的变化不相容。
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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