摘要翻译：
在最近关于国家能力的大多数文献中，战争在国家建设中的重要性假定，来自外国的威胁在国内集团之间产生共同利益，导致对国家能力的更大投资。然而，许多遭受外部冲突的国家并没有经历更多的团结。相反，他们面临经常导致破坏性内战的派系政治。本文发展了一个州际冲突对财政能力影响的理论，在这个理论中，抗击外部威胁并不总是一种共同利益的公共利益，州际冲突可能导致内战。这一理论确定了外部冲突风险增加会减少内战机会的条件，而内战反过来会导致一个政治寿命更长、更有动力投资于财政能力的政府。这些条件取决于机构的凝聚力，但以一种非琐碎和新颖的方式：外部冲突的风险较高，导致政治更替较低，但也使外国入侵更有可能，只有在机构足够缺乏凝聚力的情况下，才有助于国家建设。
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英文标题：
《External Threats, Political Turnover and Fiscal Capacity》
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作者：
Hector Galindo-Silva
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：General Economics        一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Economics        经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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英文摘要：
  In most of the recent literature on state capacity, the significance of wars in state-building assumes that threats from foreign countries generate common interests among domestic groups, leading to larger investments in state capacity. However, many countries that have suffered external conflicts don't experience increased unity. Instead, they face factional politics that often lead to destructive civil wars. This paper develops a theory of the impact of interstate conflicts on fiscal capacity in which fighting an external threat is not always a common-interest public good, and in which interstate conflicts can lead to civil wars. The theory identifies conditions under which an increased risk of external conflict decreases the chance of civil war, which in turn results in a government with a longer political life and with more incentives to invest in fiscal capacity. These conditions depend on the cohesiveness of institutions, but in a non-trivial and novel way: a higher risk of an external conflict that results in lower political turnover, but that also makes a foreign invasion more likely, contributes to state-building only if institutions are sufficiently incohesive.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2001.02322