英文标题：
《A Dichotomous Analysis of Unemployment Welfare》
---
作者：
Xingwei Hu
---
最新提交年份：
2019
---
英文摘要：
  In an economy which could not accommodate the full employment of its labor force, it employs some labor but does not employ others. The bipartition of the labor force is random, and we characterize it by an axiom of equal employment opportunity. We value each employed individual by his or her marginal contribution to the production function; we also value each unemployed individual by the potential marginal contribution the person would make if the market hired the individual. We then use the aggregate individual value to distribute the net production to the unemployment welfare and the employment benefits. Using real-time balanced-budget rule as a constraint and policy stability as an objective, we derive a scientific formula which describes a fair, debt-free, and asymptotic risk-free tax rate for any given unemployment rate and national spending level. The tax rate minimizes the asymptotic mean, variance, semi-variance, and mean absolute deviation of the underlying posterior unemployment rate. The allocation rule stimulates employment and boosts productivity. Under some symmetry assumptions, we even find that an unemployed person should enjoy equivalent employment benefits, and the tax rate goes with this welfare equality. The tool employed is the cooperative game theory in which we assume many players. The players are randomly bipartitioned, and the payoff varies with the partition. One could apply the fair distribution rule and valuation approach to other profit-sharing or cost-sharing situations with these characteristics. This framework is open to alternative identification strategies and other forms of equal opportunity axiom.
---
中文摘要：
在一个无法容纳劳动力充分就业的经济体中，它雇用一些劳动力，但不雇用其他劳动力。劳动力的二分是随机的，我们用平等就业机会公理来描述它。我们通过每个就业个体对生产函数的边际贡献来评估其价值；我们还通过市场雇佣每个失业者时，他们可能做出的边际贡献来评估每个失业者。然后，我们使用总个人价值将净生产分配给失业福利和就业福利。我们以实时平衡预算规则为约束条件，以政策稳定性为目标，推导出了一个科学的公式，该公式描述了任何给定失业率和国家支出水平下的公平、无债务和渐进无风险税率。税率最小化潜在后验失业率的渐近平均值、方差、半方差和平均绝对偏差。分配规则刺激就业，提高生产率。在一些对称假设下，我们甚至发现失业者应该享受同等的就业福利，税率与这种福利平等相一致。所使用的工具是合作博弈论，其中我们假设有许多参与者。玩家是随机二分的，并且收益随分区而变化。可以将公平分配规则和估值方法应用于具有这些特征的其他利润共享或成本共享情况。该框架对其他身份识别策略和其他形式的平等机会公理开放。
---
分类信息：

一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：General Finance        一般财务
分类描述：Development of general quantitative methodologies with applications in finance
通用定量方法的发展及其在金融中的应用
--

---
PDF下载：
-->