速读测试：德国为何不帮欧元区？The riddle of German self-interest

本文作者为英国《金融时报》首席经济评论员 马丁·沃尔夫（Martin Wolf） 测试中可能遇到的词汇和知识：
turmoil混乱
retrench节省，紧缩
liability负债
harsh严厉的，严酷的
hegemon霸权国
enigma谜
The riddle of German self-interest

How will the crises inside the eurozone end? Many people have asked me this question in the US in recent weeks. How, in particular, might the eurozone move from crisis into stability? To address this question, we need to distinguish three aspects of the turmoil: where the eurozone is going; where Germany wants the eurozone to go; and where the eurozone needs to go.

The eurozone’s current position seems depressingly clear. A number of member countries, two of them – Italy and Spain – being large, already have, or are on the verge of having, governments unable to manage their public debt unassisted. Much of that debt is held by their banks. Many of these have been damaged, particularly in countries that experienced huge real-estate bubbles, large fiscal deficits or both. Governments with weak creditworthiness feel compelled to rescue fragile banking systems that are, in turn, expected to finance the governments trying to support them: the drunks are seeking to stay upright by leaning on one another.

Governments are also required to attempt fiscal austerity when private sectors are retrenching: between 2007 and 2012, the financial balance of the private sector shifted from deficit towards surplus by 16 per cent of gross domestic product in Spain (see chart). Austerity further weakens both economies and banks. This, in turn, raises unemployment and lowers government revenue, rendering fiscal austerity ineffective. Meanwhile, slack demand in the core reinforces economic weakness in the periphery, rather than offsets it.With banks impaired, private demand damaged, government demand contracting and external demand weak, the fragile economies are likely to have smaller output and higher unemployment two or three years hence than now. The reward for pain today is pain tomorrow.

Whether or not Greece is “saved”, for the moment it is hard to believe today’s eurozone would survive this, particularly when the principal argument in its favour – that for economic and financial integration – is being destroyed. Businesses, particularly financial institutions, increasingly seek to match assets and liabilities by country. Equally, only the bravest business will plan production in the belief that exchange rate risk has been eliminated. With a rising share of cross-border risk now assumed by the European Central Bank, the way to break-up is becoming more open.

This looks like a long day’s journey into night. It might take weeks, months or years. But the direction, alas, seems ever clearer.

Now turn to the second issue: how does Germany want the eurozone to be organised? This is how I understand the views of the German government and monetary authorities: no eurozone bonds; no increase in funds available to the European Stability Mechanism (currently