摘要翻译：
我们建立了一个经验框架来识别和估计当治疗是战略互动（例如，讨价还价、寡头进入、同行效应）的结果时治疗对利益结果的影响。在一个具有内生性的不可分模型中，我们考虑了一个Agent在完全信息下进行离散博弈的模型，其均衡行为（即二元处理）决定了博弈后的结果。由于第一阶段的同时性，模型整体上是不完整的，选择过程没有表现出传统的单调性。在没有施加参数限制或大的支持假设的情况下，这给恢复治疗参数带来了挑战。为了应对这些挑战，我们首先建立了第一阶段博弈均衡的单调模式，即选择治疗的数量。在此基础上，我们导出了在非参数形状限制和排除外生变量存在的情况下平均治疗效应的界。我们发现，补偿战略替代的工具变异有助于解决多重均衡问题。我们将我们的方法应用于美国城市航空公司和空气污染的数据，我们发现(i)每个航空公司对污染的因果效应是正的，(ii)这种效应在公司数量上是增加的，但以减少的速度。
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英文标题：
《Multiple Treatments with Strategic Interaction》
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作者：
Jorge Balat, Sukjin Han
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Econometrics        计量经济学
分类描述：Econometric Theory, Micro-Econometrics, Macro-Econometrics, Empirical Content of Economic Relations discovered via New Methods, Methodological Aspects of the Application of Statistical Inference to Economic Data.
计量经济学理论，微观计量经济学，宏观计量经济学，通过新方法发现的经济关系的实证内容，统计推论应用于经济数据的方法论方面。
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一级分类：Statistics        统计学
二级分类：Applications        应用程序
分类描述：Biology, Education, Epidemiology, Engineering, Environmental Sciences, Medical, Physical Sciences, Quality Control, Social Sciences
生物学，教育学，流行病学，工程学，环境科学，医学，物理科学，质量控制，社会科学
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一级分类：Statistics        统计学
二级分类：Methodology        方法论
分类描述：Design, Surveys, Model Selection, Multiple Testing, Multivariate Methods, Signal and Image Processing, Time Series, Smoothing, Spatial Statistics, Survival Analysis, Nonparametric and Semiparametric Methods
设计，调查，模型选择，多重检验，多元方法，信号和图像处理，时间序列，平滑，空间统计，生存分析，非参数和半参数方法
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英文摘要：
  We develop an empirical framework to identify and estimate the effects of treatments on outcomes of interest when the treatments are the result of strategic interaction (e.g., bargaining, oligopolistic entry, peer effects). We consider a model where agents play a discrete game with complete information whose equilibrium actions (i.e., binary treatments) determine a post-game outcome in a nonseparable model with endogeneity. Due to the simultaneity in the first stage, the model as a whole is incomplete and the selection process fails to exhibit the conventional monotonicity. Without imposing parametric restrictions or large support assumptions, this poses challenges in recovering treatment parameters. To address these challenges, we first establish a monotonic pattern of the equilibria in the first-stage game in terms of the number of treatments selected. Based on this finding, we derive bounds on the average treatment effects (ATEs) under nonparametric shape restrictions and the existence of excluded exogenous variables. We show that instrument variation that compensates strategic substitution helps solve the multiple equilibria problem. We apply our method to data on airlines and air pollution in cities in the U.S. We find that (i) the causal effect of each airline on pollution is positive, and (ii) the effect is increasing in the number of firms but at a decreasing rate.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1805.08275