摘要翻译：
我们在信号博弈的非均衡学习模型中加入了参与者知道对手的收益函数和合理性的假设。代理人是天生的球员角色，每个时期与随机对手比赛。没有经验的代理人不确定对手游戏的普遍分布，但相信对手从不选择有条件支配的策略。代理参与主动学习，并根据个人观察更新信念。回报信息可以改进或扩大学习预测，因为有耐心的年轻发送者的实验动机取决于他们认为哪些接收者的反应是合理的。我们证明了在有收益知识的情况下，长期学习结果的极限集上有界于理性相容均衡(RCE)，下有界于一致RCE。RCE完善了直觉标准（Cho和Kreps，1987)，并包括所有的神平衡（Banks和Sobel，1987)。均匀的RCE有时但不总是存在，并暗示着普遍的神圣平衡。
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英文标题：
《Payoff Information and Learning in Signaling Games》
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作者：
Drew Fudenberg, Kevin He
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model of non-equilibrium learning in signaling games. Agents are born into player roles and play against random opponents every period. Inexperienced agents are uncertain about the prevailing distribution of opponents' play, but believe that opponents never choose conditionally dominated strategies. Agents engage in active learning and update beliefs based on personal observations. Payoff information can refine or expand learning predictions, since patient young senders' experimentation incentives depend on which receiver responses they deem plausible. We show that with payoff knowledge, the limiting set of long-run learning outcomes is bounded above by rationality-compatible equilibria (RCE), and bounded below by uniform RCE. RCE refine the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) and include all divine equilibria (Banks and Sobel, 1987). Uniform RCE sometimes but not always exists, and implies universally divine equilibrium.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1709.01024