摘要翻译：
严格策略证明机制是一种要求Agent使用严格支配策略的机制。在具有私有值的规范一维机构设计中，我们证明了严格策略证明性等价于严格单调性加上包络公式，这与一个著名的（弱）策略证明性的特征相呼应。一个结果是，策略证明性可以通过任意小的修改而变得严格，因此严格性“本质上是免费的”。
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英文标题：
《Strictly strategy-proof auctions》
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作者：
Matteo Escud\'e and Ludvig Sinander
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  A strictly strategy-proof mechanism is one that asks agents to use strictly dominant strategies. In the canonical one-dimensional mechanism design setting with private values, we show that strict strategy-proofness is equivalent to strict monotonicity plus the envelope formula, echoing a well-known characterisation of (weak) strategy-proofness. A consequence is that strategy-proofness can be made strict by an arbitrarily small modification, so that strictness is 'essentially for free'.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.11864