摘要翻译：
在战略形式的博弈中，如果没有可行的代理人（或参与者）联盟（在帕累托意义上）从共同改变他们的战略中受益，那么战略轮廓就是一个均衡。较弱或较强的平衡概念可以通过考虑联盟形成的各种限制来定义。例如，在纳什均衡中，假设可行的联盟是单人的，而在超强均衡中，每个联盟都是可行的。对联盟形成的限制可以通过沟通限制、协调问题或体制限制来证明是合理的。在本文中，受各种现实生活场景中社会结构的启发，我们引入了联盟形成的某些限制，并在这些限制的基础上引入了一些均衡概念。作为应用，我们研究了资源选择对策(RSGs)中的均衡概念，给出了一般RSGs及其重要特例的一组完整的存在性和不存在性结果。
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英文标题：
《On Existence of Equilibrium Under Social Coalition Structures》
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作者：
Bugra Caskurlu, Ozgun Ekici, Fatih Erdem Kizilkaya
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  In a strategic form game a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents (or players) benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can be defined by considering various restrictions on coalition formation. In a Nash equilibrium, for instance, the assumption is that viable coalitions are singletons, and in a super strong equilibrium, every coalition is viable. Restrictions on coalition formation can be justified by communication limitations, coordination problems or institutional constraints. In this paper, inspired by social structures in various real-life scenarios, we introduce certain restrictions on coalition formation, and on their basis we introduce a number of equilibrium notions. As an application we study our equilibrium notions in resource selection games (RSGs), and we present a complete set of existence and non-existence results for general RSGs and their important special cases.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1910.04648