摘要翻译：
目前由公平分配网站Spliddit领导的免嫉妒租金划分的做法是基于准线性偏好。这些偏好排除了代理商有据可查的财务限制。为了解决这个问题，我们考虑分段线性预算约束偏好。这些偏好承认代理人支付低于和高于给定参考的租金的边际负效用的差异，即软预算。我们构造了一个多项式算法来计算一个最大最小效用无羡慕分配，以及其他相关的解决方案，在这个领域。
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英文标题：
《A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on
  a soft budget》
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作者：
Rodrigo A. Velez
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  The current practice of envy-free rent division, lead by the fair allocation website Spliddit, is based on quasi-linear preferences. These preferences rule out agents' well documented financial constraints. To resolve this issue we consider piece-wise linear budget constrained preferences. These preferences admit differences in agents' marginal disutility of paying rent below and above a given reference, i.e., a soft budget. We construct a polynomial algorithm to calculate a maxmin utility envy-free allocation, and other related solutions, in this domain.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.02966