摘要翻译：
自1950年以来，印度一直在实施世界上最全面的平权行动方案。纵向保留地提供给历史上受歧视的在册种姓(SC)、在册部落(ST)和其他落后阶层(OBC)的成员。在每一纵向类别内为其他弱势群体，如妇女和残疾人提供横向保留。没有明确规定的程序将横向保留与纵向保留和OBC取消保留联合执行。目前用于OBC取消保留和有功后备候选人的顺序程序导致了严重的缺点。最重要的是，目前在实践中使用的间接机制不允许保留类别申请者充分表达其偏好。为了克服这些问题和其他相关问题，我们设计了几种不同的选择规则，这些规则考虑了精英管理、纵向和横向保留以及OBC取消保留。我们建议建立一个集中的机制来令人满意地清理印度的匹配市场。
---
英文标题：
《Designing Direct Matching Mechanism for India with Comprehensive
  Affirmative Action》
---
作者：
Orhan Ayg\"un and Bertan Turhan
---
最新提交年份：
2020
---
分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
--

---
英文摘要：
  Since 1950, India has been implementing the most comprehensive affirmative action program in the world. Vertical reservations are provided to members of historically discriminated Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), and Other Backward Classes (OBC). Horizontal reservations are provided for other disadvantaged groups, such as women and disabled people, within each vertical category. There is no well-defined procedure to implement horizontal reservations jointly with vertical reservation and OBC de-reservations. Sequential processes currently in use for OBC de-reservations and meritorious reserve candidates lead to severe shortcomings. Most importantly, indirect mechanisms currently used in practice do not allow reserve category applicants to fully express their preferences. To overcome these and other related issues, we design several different choice rules for institutions that take meritocracy, vertical and horizontal reservations, and OBC de-reservations into account. We propose a centralized mechanism to satisfactorily clear matching markets in India.
---
PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2004.13264