金融借贷网络中的系统性信用冻结

SYSTEMIC CREDIT FREEZES IN FINANCIAL LENDING NETWORKS

作者：

达龙·阿塞莫格卢（Daron Acemoglu）

阿苏曼·奥兹达格拉（Asuman Ozdaglar）

詹姆斯·西德留斯（James Siderius）

Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi

This paper develops a network model of interbank lending, in which banks decide to extendcredit to their potential borrowers. Borrowers are subject to shocks that may force them to defaulton their loans. In contrast to much of the previous literature on financial networks, we focus onhow anticipation of future defaults may result in ex ante “credit freezes,” whereby banks refuse toextend credit to one another. We first characterize the terms of the interbank contracts and thepatterns of interbank lending that emerge in equilibrium. We then study how shifts in thedistribution of shocks can result in complex credit freezes that travel throughout the network. Weuse this framework to analyze the effects of various policy interventions on systemic creditfreezes.
本文建立了银行间同业拆借网络模型，在该模型中，银行决定向其潜在借款人提供信贷。借款人可能遭受冲击，可能会迫使他们拖欠其贷款。与以往有关金融网络的许多文献形成对比，我们关注的是对未来违约的预期可能导致事前的“信贷冻结”，从而银行拒绝相互授信。我们首先描述银行间合同的条款和均衡出现的银行间借贷模式。然后，我们研究冲击分布的变化如何导致遍及整个网络的复杂信用冻结。我们使用此框架来分析各种政策干预对系统性信用冻结的影响。