长时间没做过微观题目了，所以就不会做了！希望会的同学能帮忙解答一下！

ŸAssume a duopoly.
The two firms (firm 1 and firm 2) are producing perfectly

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substitutable goods q1 and q2 and are facing the following inverse demand schedules:

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Firm 1:  p1=20+0.5p2-q1

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Firm 2:  p2=20+0.5p1-q2

ŸEach firm has a constant marginal cost of 20 and there are no fixed costs.
Further assume that each firm is a Cournot competitor in PRICE, not quantity.

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(a)
Explain the concept of Cournot equilibrium under this market context.

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(b)
Derive the Cournot equilibrium price and quantity for each firm under this market context.