摘要翻译：
在一个经济模型中，静态稳定意味着偏离均衡策略的负激励，我们期望只要代理人对激励做出反应，就能保证回归均衡，即动态稳定。已经有很多人试图证明这种联系，特别是在进化博弈论中，产生了消极和积极的结果。本文提供了一个普遍和直观的方法来解决这个问题。通过揭示精确优化中扭曲背后的代价和约束，我们证明了只要Agent的切换策略决策是合理的，静态稳定性就保证了动态稳定性。这种思想指导我们跟踪开关的剩余期望最大收益，扣除成本后，并在约束条件下最大化，作为一个非均衡指标，即李雅普诺夫函数。虽然我们在这里的分析局限于种群博弈中短视的进化动力学，但我们的方法适用于更复杂的情况。
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英文标题：
《Gains in evolutionary dynamics: A unifying and intuitive approach to
  linking static and dynamic stability》
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作者：
Dai Zusai
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Mathematics        数学
二级分类：Optimization and Control        优化与控制
分类描述：Operations research, linear programming, control theory, systems theory, optimal control, game theory
运筹学，线性规划，控制论，系统论，最优控制，博弈论
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一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  Static stability in an economic model means negative incentives for deviation from equilibrium strategies, which we expect to assure a return to equilibrium, i.e., dynamic stability, as long as agents respond to incentives. There have been many attempts to prove this link, especially in evolutionary game theory, yielding both negative and positive results. This paper offers a universal and intuitive approach to this link. We prove static stability assures dynamic stability as long as agents' decisions of switching strategies are rationalizable by revealing costs and constraints behind distortions from exact optimization. This idea guides us to track the remaining expected maximal payoff gain from switches, after deducting the costs and to be maximized subject to the constraints, as a disequilibrium index, namely, a Lyapunov function. While our analysis here is confined to myopic evolutionary dynamics in population games, our approach is applicable to more complex situations.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1805.04898