英文标题：
《Explaining Cost Overruns of Large-Scale Transportation Infrastructure
  Projects using a Signalling Game》
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作者：
Chantal C. Cantarelli, Caspar G. Chorus, and Scott W. Cunningham
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最新提交年份：
2013
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英文摘要：
  Strategic behaviour is one of the main explanations for cost overruns. It can theoretically be supported by agency theory, in which strategic behaviour is the result of asymmetric information between the principal and agent. This paper gives a formal account of this relation by a signalling game. This is a game with incomplete information which considers the way in which parties anticipate upon other parties\' behaviour in choosing a course of action. The game shows how cost overruns are the result of an inappropriate signal. This makes it impossible for the principal to distinguish between the types of agents, and hence, allows for strategic behaviour. It is illustrated how cost overruns can be avoided by means of two policy measures, e.g. an accountability structure and benchmarking.
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中文摘要：
战略行为是成本超支的主要解释之一。这在理论上可以得到代理理论的支持，在代理理论中，战略行为是委托人和代理人之间信息不对称的结果。本文通过一个信号博弈给出了这种关系的形式化描述。这是一个信息不完整的游戏，考虑各方在选择行动方案时对其他各方行为的预期方式。这个游戏展示了成本超支是由不恰当的信号造成的。这使得委托人无法区分代理人的类型，从而允许战略行为。本文说明了如何通过两种政策措施避免成本超支，例如问责结构和基准。
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分类信息：

一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：General Finance        一般财务
分类描述：Development of general quantitative methodologies with applications in finance
通用定量方法的发展及其在金融中的应用
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